

# **Sustainable Budgeting Approach (SBA) to finance Inclusive Green Economy (IGE)**

*A practical approach for policymakers to understand and effectively trade-off the development, environmental, and social consequences of fiscal policy options.*

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Summary background paper for the 8<sup>th</sup> African Regional Forum on Sustainable Development  
*UN Environment Programme and the University of Oxford*

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## **1. INTRODUCTION**

**Consequential policy decisions are often made with incomplete or imperfect information about their potential environmental, social, and development impacts.** Most countries design spending and taxation decisions without an adequate understanding of the full spectrum of inter-linked impacts of individual policy choices and their alignment with national sustainable development objectives—potentially bringing unintended costs to citizens, businesses, the environment, and future generations. Sub-optimal fiscal decisions leave potential development gains on the table.

When fiscal resources are scarce, there is very little room for error. This is the case in many African countries and other emerging and lower-income countries around the world, where the consequences of uninformed decision making can be particularly damaging. This is particularly true in the COVID-19 era, where social care costs are inflated, taxation revenues dramatically reduced, and pathways to a normalised post-COVID era are uncertain.

Beyond understanding the impacts of individual decisions, policy makers also lack effective mechanisms for tracking the cumulative impacts of their budgets—making it challenging to demonstrate progress to donors, secure new financial support, and lower borrowing costs. With emerging global transparency tools, like the [Global Recovery Observatory](#), governments are able to take more informed fiscal decision making. This trend will accelerate strongly in the 2020s. Building back better from the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) while advancing the full implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Agenda 2063 requires a systematic integration of sustainability considerations in national policymaking design and implementation. Failing to do so will bring even harsher consequences on those most marginalised in society—including women and youth.

**UNEP and the University of Oxford are building a practical enabling tool for policymakers, based on leading socio-economic and environmental science, to (i) understand the development, environmental, and social consequences of budgetary decisions and to (ii) assess the overall characteristics of their budgets and compare this to other nations.** The approach itself is applicable across geographies. To incorporate the unique characteristics of different nations, we are developing **country-calibrated tools** to directly assist government staff in assessing and tracking their budgets—this was successfully piloted in Gabon in 2021 as part of the INFF project together with UNDP Gabon (figure 1).




Figure 1. Climate characteristics of 2021 budget expenditures in Republique Gabonaise (case study with SBA tool). Includes PPP spending.

**At ARFSD, the SBA will be introduced for the first time.** There will be an opportunity to learn more about the approach and its potential to contribute directly Goals 1-8 of Agenda 2063, to provide input to improve the Framework, and to signal interest in having a country-calibrated tool developed for any nation or group of nations.

## 2. KEY TRENDS AND PROGRESS

### 2.1 Africa and development: Agendas 2063 and 2030

Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, many African countries had been making strong progress on development. The *SDG Index and Dashboards Report 2019* found that 48 of 54 African countries had made official statements endorsing the implementation of SDGs according to the UN 2030 Agenda, showing the region's high commitment to the issue.<sup>1</sup> In particular, based on available data, a majority of African countries are on track to meeting the Climate Action SDG target (SDG 13) and moderate progress has been made in clean water and sanitation (SDG 6).<sup>2</sup> Efforts in provision of clean water and sanitation have been particularly successful in North Africa, where every country is either on track to SDG achievement, or moderately improving.<sup>3</sup> The set of goals in the African Union's Agenda 2063 broadly align with those in Agenda 2030, each providing standards for equality, living, sustainability, and peace<sup>4</sup>; while the region as a whole was far from achieving all these committed targets, an upwards trajectory was clear before 2020.

Yet, despite progress, even before COVID-19, Africa remains as one of the poorest regions in world, inadequately supported by international partners. In 2015, 41% of Africa was living in poverty—meeting SDG 1 (eradicate extreme poverty by 2030) remains a long way off.<sup>5</sup> On current trends, there will be 31 million deaths of children under the age of 5 between 2018 and 2030.<sup>6</sup> 52% of Africans do not have access to the healthcare services they need.<sup>7</sup> Half of youth aged 12-14 have no access to education, almost 60% of those aged 15-17 are not in school, and girls are disproportionately disadvantaged.<sup>8</sup> In sum, even before COVID-19, the gaps to the goals of the 2030 Agenda and 2063 Agenda in Africa were immense, and international support inadequate.

<sup>1</sup> SDG Centre for Africa and Sustainable Development Solutions Network. (2019). *Africa SDG Index and Dashboards Report 2019*. Kigali and New York: SDG Centre for Africa and Sustainable Development Solutions Network. Pg. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, Pg. 22.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, Pg. 25.

<sup>4</sup> The African Union Commission. (2021). *Linking Agenda 2-63 and the SDGs*. The African Union Commission.

<sup>5</sup> Beegle, K. & Christiansen, L. (2019). *Accelerating Poverty Reduction in Africa*. The World Bank. Pg. 2.

<sup>6</sup> UNICEF. (2019). *Children in Africa: Key statistics on child survival and population*. UNICEF. Pg. 1.

<sup>7</sup> Africa Health Agenda International Conference. (2021). *The State of Universal Health Coverage in Africa: Report of the Africa Health Agenda International Conference Commission*. The AHAIC Commission. Pg. 8.

<sup>8</sup> UIS. (2019). *Fact Sheet no. 56*. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. Pg. 4.

## 2.2 Africa and COVID-19

The Covid-19 pandemic has dramatically exacerbated Africa's pre-existing economic and development challenges. Increased costs, declining foreign investment under unstable conditions, and insufficient foreign aid have mounted pressure on national budgets, severely restricting the ability for governments to invest in recovery. Operating with already limited fiscal space, governments across the region must now cope with expanded health and social care costs,<sup>9</sup> while taxation revenues have collapsed.<sup>10</sup> A UNCTAD report (2020) estimates that, under severe recession, the aggregate African tax revenue will deviate by -5.3% from the baseline because of the COVID-19 pandemic, with more severe revenue losses in Nigeria (-11.4%), Egypt (-10.6%), Malawi (-10.2%), and Eswatini (-9.3%).<sup>11</sup> At the same time, health costs and expenditure increased across African nations: Zimbabwe had to increase its health budget by 139% from US\$131 million in 2019 to US\$300 million in 2020;<sup>12</sup> Burundi increased its health budget by 31.5% in 2020/21, compared to 2019/20.<sup>13</sup>

African economies, with a relatively low proportion of jobs in the knowledge economy, have proven less resilient to the pandemic slowdown. More than just hedging economies against manufacturing and sectoral economic shocks, knowledge has emerged as a fundamental economic driver.<sup>14</sup> Knowledge improves the effectiveness and efficiency of economic activities. The economic fallout of COVID-19 promises to amplify existing inequalities within society, leading to the further marginalisation of disadvantaged groups and threatening the "Leave No One Behind" philosophy underpinning the SDG's 2030 Agenda. Investing in green transition, education, and technological advancement could provide the opportunities and skills needed to set the trajectory of the continent's long-term growth, increase the resilience of African Economies, and reduce inequality. The economic damage from the pandemic has underscored the need to integrate prudent investments in these areas with economic recovery plans, for both their immediate and long-term growth effects.<sup>15</sup> A strong recovery thus also likely benefits from policies to expand the knowledge economy.

**One of the most significant challenges faced by African countries in their recovery from this crisis, and their ongoing development, is restricted fiscal space.** As made clear by the Leave No One Behind Agenda (Figure 2), this is not a new phenomenon. Donor commitments remain unfulfilled on many fronts: promises of 0.7% of GDP to international development in the *Doha Declaration on Financing for Development Agenda* and the *Addis Ababa Action Agenda* have not been met and commitments to climate finance under the Paris Agreement also remain in limbo. **As a result, fiscal recovery investment in Africa has so far been dramatically lower than in other parts of the world.**<sup>16</sup> Figure 3, from [Global Recovery Observatory](#), shows tiny recovery spending in LDCs, with other developing nations an order of magnitude beyond the region, and advanced economies on an entirely separate plane.<sup>17</sup> Indeed, whilst inequality within regions has grown because of the pandemic, the greatest increase in inequality is likely to come between regions. Per capita recovery spending in most African states is less than 1/250<sup>th</sup> that of advanced economies, driving the wedge ever further between the Global North and South and threatening global stability.

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<sup>9</sup> SDG Centre for Africa and Sustainable Development Solutions Network. (2020). *Africa SDG Index and Dashboards Report 2020*. Kigali and New York: SDG Centre for Africa and Sustainable Development Solutions Network. Pg. 7.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, Pg. 4.

<sup>11</sup> Gondwe, G. (2020). *Assessing Impact of COVID-19 on Africa's Economic Development*. UNCTAD. Pg. 11, 16.

<sup>12</sup> UNICEF. (2020). *2020 Zimbabwe Health Budget Brief*. UNICEF. Pg. 3.

<sup>13</sup> UNICEF. (2021). *Burundi National Budget Brief*. UNICEF. Pg. 5.

<sup>14</sup> Asongu, S.A. & Kuada, J. (2020). *Building knowledge economies in Africa: an introduction*. *Contemporary Social Science*, 15:1, 1-6.

<sup>15</sup> O'Callaghan, B. & Murdock, E. (2021). *Are We Building Back Better?. Evidence from 2020 and Pathways to Inclusive Green Recovery Spending*. United Nations Environment Programme. Pg. 4-5.

<sup>16</sup> O'Callaghan, B. (2021). *Are We Building Back Better: COP 26*. Global Recovery Observatory.

<sup>17</sup> Non-Annex 1 Countries includes the subset of LDCs, of which 33 of 46 are currently on the African continent (Ibid)



Figure 2. Challenges facing the Leave No One Behind Agenda. Figure reprinted from Africa SDG Index and Dashboards Report 2019.




Figure 3. Covid-related spending per capita across development categories (USD). Source: Global Recovery Observatory, produced by Oxford University, GFN (UNEP, IMF, GIZ), and UNDP

### **3. EMERGING ISSUES IN FISCAL MANAGEMENT**

#### **3.1 The importance of responsible fiscal management**

Effective fiscal policy is key to resuming strong progress on the SDGs in Africa, as it can powerfully accelerate economic development, while furthering environmental and social objectives. Responsible fiscal management is also often a prerequisite to gaining expanded international aid—demonstrating that fiscal investments are making progress on both climate and development could significantly increase donor interest.

Many researchers have highlighted the potential for some fiscal investments to simultaneously support economic, social, and environmental objectives. Hepburn et al. (2020) suggest five specific fiscal policies for the efficient pursuit of economic and climate goals, with specific

policy recommendations for Low-to-Middle-Income Countries (LMICs).<sup>18</sup> Recommended global policies include clean physical infrastructure investment; building efficiency retrofits; investment in education and training to address immediate unemployment from COVID-19 and structural unemployment from decarbonisation; natural capital investment for ecosystem resilience and regeneration; and clean R&D investment. However, the fiscal space to enable these investments is severely limited for African countries, especially in the wake of COVID-19. With these constraints in mind, it is increasingly essential that fiscal spending in the region be more deliberate and efficient, and that foreign aid increase significantly.<sup>19</sup> Importantly, the former is often a prerequisite to the latter.

To the end of more deliberate spending research has found that green investments are promising. Hasna (2021) finds that “a \$1 increase in green investment increases state-level output by \$1.1 contemporaneously, and up to \$4.2 within two years of implementation”<sup>20</sup>, suggesting that green initiatives increase efficiency through a multiplier effect. Vivid Economics modelling has also suggested that investing in green initiatives could create up to ≈60% more jobs in the short-term and as much as ≈140% greater economic value in the long-term, compared to traditional alternatives<sup>21</sup>. To this end, O’Callaghan & Adam (2021) propose six specific forms of foreign aid provision tailored for a sustainable economic recovery, including green bonds and private sector debt guarantees, ultimately pushing to increase global green spending.<sup>19</sup> O’Callaghan and Murdock (2021) find that global green spending is “so far incommensurate with the scale of ongoing environmental crises and that associated economic and social gains are not being fully captured”.<sup>22</sup> **Without a significant increase in support for public investment initiatives, increased funding, and more judicious spending, Africa will not meet its SDGs according to the 2030 Agenda, nor the Agenda 2063 goals.**

**The consequences of suboptimal fiscal decision making will be felt for generations to come—and marginalised communities are likely to be the hardest hit. This includes women, gender minorities and youth.**

### 3.2 Enabling responsible fiscal management through better tools

The scale and urgency of challenges facing Africa require that national economic policymaking is aligned with Agenda 2030 and Agenda 2063. Robust fiscal planning that heeds economic, social and environmental impact does not, however, feature prominently in the budget decision making of many African countries. Indeed, many nations in the region do not have a systematic review or planning process at all when it comes to national budget design. This is due, at least in part, to an absence of tools to help policymakers compare, contrast, and commit to policy initiatives. To this end, UNECA has sponsored the Integrated Planning and Reporting Toolkit (IPRT), a software application developed to help African countries adopt and integrate both the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Agenda 2063 into their national development. The IPRT software dynamically assesses policy planning frameworks’ alignment with both Agendas, enabling the visualisation of country performance regarding alignment, as well as progress in implementing these plans.<sup>23</sup> As expounded below, the SBA is a policy planning and assessment framework. As such, the IPRT and SBA are compatible and mutually supportive.

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<sup>18</sup> Hepburn, C. et al. (2020). *Will COVID-19 fiscal recovery packages accelerate or retard progress on climate change?*. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 36, No. S1. (2020).

<sup>19</sup> O’Callaghan, B. & Adam, J.P. (2021). *Are COVID-10 discal recovery measures bridging or extending the emissions gap?*. Emissions Gap Report 2021: The Heat is on. Pg. 45-46.

<sup>20</sup> Hasna, Z. (2021). *The Grass Is Actually Greener on the Other Side: Evidence on Green Multipliers from the United States*. Pg. 15-16.

<sup>21</sup> O’Callaghan, B., Murdock, E., & Bird, J. (2021). *A Prosperous Green Recovery for South Africa*. Oxford University Economic Recovery Project. Pg. 2.

<sup>22</sup> O’Callaghan, B. & Murdock, E. (2021). *Are We Building Back Better?. Evidence from 2020 and Pathways to Inclusive Green Recovery Spending*. United Nations Environment Programme. Pg. 4-5.

<sup>23</sup> UNECA. (2019). *Integrated Planning and Reporting Toolkit: A dynamic software for aligning the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2030 and national development plans. Information Note and Frequently Asked Questions*. UNECA.

In many cases, the largest sources of multi-year financial flows and allocations within a developing nation are its fiscal allocations. These are also a key enabling factor for private finance flows. Without appropriate planning tools, these fiscal flows are likely to be structured and implemented with little sustainability screening. This is a wasted opportunity, as highlighted by the [Global Recovery Observatory](#) and the [accompanying analysis](#), given that some of the most economically effective stimulus policies are the very same policies that will lead us towards deep decarbonization, improvements in pollution and nature loss, and help us address the global and domestic inequalities that have only grown since 2020.

**For this issue, we can learn from new approaches to understanding potential spending policy impacts used during COVID-19. Although very much directional in nature, these efforts have enabled robust policy debate across the world and influenced part of the USD 16.97 trillion observed in global COVID-19 recovery spending.<sup>24</sup> Ongoing work to expand the COVID-19 tools to include job impact assessments and more precise natural capital impacts highlight opportunities for evidence-based course correction.**

**The SBA provides a step towards action, uniting leading environmental and socio-economic science with socio-cultural perspectives to bring simple and accessible tools to policymakers. The utility of these tools is compounded by the fact that they can be calibrated directly by policymakers based on the needs and context of their country.** The systematic tracking and assessment (environmental and socio-economic) of disaggregated national budgets it allows would not only bring both unprecedented transparency and accountability to the use of public funds, but also encourage countries to better design and plan for public spending. Civil society and other key stakeholders would have a key evidence-based advocacy tool to push for bottom-up change in priorities, whilst our sustainability-first framing can also enable national policymaking from the top-down.

The SBA could potentially facilitate increased financing flows from development finance institutions (DFIs) in support of national commitments under Agenda 2030 and Agenda 2063 by enabling greater transparency around public finance efficiency, use of funds, and disaggregated data on sectoral growth outlook. There is also an opportunity for countries to signal commitment to, and communicate credible action on, aligning national economic policymaking with sustainable and inclusive growth pathways.

In the long term, combining national and global databases would help policymakers and researchers learn more about which types of policies can respond to both political economy incentives and the environment. Data could also be aggregated by sectors to provide targeted intelligence and state of progress towards Agenda 2030 objectives. For the 2063 Agenda, the SBA can support measurement of progress and inform concrete action aligned with the key activities identified in its 10 year Implementation Plans to deliver Transformational Outcomes for Africa's people.<sup>25,26</sup>

**It is important to note that the path from SBA implementation to a sustainable transition is not a straight line—complementary fiscal and monetary action is required to go from measurement to management.**

**Ultimately, we target an integrated, prosperous, and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens, representing a dynamic force in the international arena.**

### **3.3 Building from covid-19 green recovery efforts**

The global fiscal response to the COVID-19 pandemic was, and continues to be, unprecedented. It is unprecedented in its scale, in its regional breadth, and in the types of investments it supports. Over the last two years, civil society, researchers, commentators, and

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<sup>24</sup> Global Recovery Observatory. (2021).

<sup>25</sup> African Union. (2020). *Key Transformational Outcomes of Agenda 2063*. Addis Ababa.

<sup>26</sup> African Union. (2012). *The First-Ten Year Implementation Plan*. Addis Ababa.

multilateral organisations have petitioned governments to make their economic recoveries green, and they have seen some success in their efforts. Indeed, the percentage of global recovery spending that is green has slowly increased over the course of the pandemic.

One initiative, from the Global Recovery Observatory, has brought transparency to government spending habits to prompt better behaviour (see figure 4). The program, run by the University of Oxford and supported by the Global Fiscal Policy Network (UNEP, IMF, and GIZ) and UNDP, tracks eighty-nine of the world's economies on a live basis and assesses the environmental characteristics of their spending. Figure 4 illustrates the result of the Observatory's tracking: it shows the degree to which economies are making sustainable decisions in their COVID-19 recovery spending. The Observatory has found success in helping government decision makers learn from the actions of other governments—to understand where green investments have been made and how they might secure economic gains. To this end, the Observatory has featured in reports, analyses, and consultations of over 20 national governments, and had its output reprinted everywhere from *Nature* to *The Guardian* to *Time Magazine* to the *UN Emissions Gap Report*. The SBA is directly based on the methodology of the Global Recovery Observatory.




Figure 4. Green recovery spending as a percentage of total recovery spending versus recovery spending as a percentage of GDP. Countries that have spent 0% green but less than 1.0% of GDP on recovery include, arranged by contribution, Antigua and Barbuda (0%), Cuba (0%), Guatemala (0%), Guyana (0%), Iran (0%), Nicaragua (0%), Paraguay (0%), Rwanda (0%), Uruguay (0%), Vietnam (0%), Venezuela (0%), Indonesia (0.01%), Romania (0.01%), Singapore (0.03%), Costa Rica (0.04%), Russia (0.05%), Czech Republic (0.07%), El Salvador (0.08%), UAE (0.10%), Ecuador (0.11%), Taiwan (0.11%), Malaysia (0.13%), Thailand (0.15%), Honduras (0.19%), Egypt (0.40%), Kazakhstan (0.40%), Haiti (0.47%), Belize (0.49%), Saudi Arabia (0.53%), Trinidad and Tobago (0.67%), Portugal (0.75%), and Kyrgyz Republic (0.77%). Countries that have spent 0% green and more than 1.0% of GDP on recovery include Saint Lucia (1.54%), Saint Kitts and Nevis (1.65%), Ghana (2.12%), Iraq (2.38%), Mexico (2.38%), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (2.50%), Bahamas (2.97%), Grenada (2.99%), Suriname (3.05%), Bolivia (3.49%), Morocco (3.90%), Dominica (6.29%), Peru (6.61%), Mongolia (14.27%), and the Philippines (28.12%). Data from Global Recovery Observatory in October 2021.

#### **4. TRANSFORMATIVE ACTIONS - SUSTAINABLE BUDGETING APPROACH (SBA)**

The SBA's taxonomy, grounded in the methodology of the Global Recovery Observatory, aims to help policy makers understand the environmental, social, and development characteristics of potential and actual fiscal policy decisions. In addition, it can also be a powerful tool for increased transparency and accountability for Member States, providing useful forward guidance, signalling, and credible monitoring for potential investors and financial institutions.

The SBA has been successfully piloted in Gabon, collaborating with a multi-ministry group including the Ministry of Water and Forests, the Sea and the Environment, the Ministry of Finance, and others. Under the Joint SDG Fund, this application has produced a sustainability-oriented Public Financial Management (PFM) review of Gabon as a baseline to understand its public financial position, and its progress towards SDGs and climate objectives, before integrating a new green fiscal taxonomy into the Gabonese policy-making process. This covered the full universe of country-calibrated fiscal policy options, so that public investment options and taxation options were fully mapped out for policymakers to deliberate.


While still in its pilot stage, the SBA will, with stakeholders' cooperation, catalyse progress towards the fulfilment of nationally-set principles and the attainment of other development agenda items, including Leave No One Behind (LNOB); the integrated, indivisible and interlinked nature of the SDGs; and integrated implementation of the SDGs/Agenda 2063 goals with other Agendas/frameworks such as the Paris Agreement, SAMOA Pathway, the Sendai Framework, and the Agreement on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCTA).

**Tabling the SBA at ARFSD will facilitate new interactions with policy makers on the topic and hopefully lead to new piloting programs across the continent.**

**Our five-part sustainable budgeting approach is summarised below:**

##### **A. Record policies**

Spending and taxation measures are recorded at the policy and sub-policy/program level. Spending policy-level measures are easily found in the national budget (and any relevant supplements), sub-policy/program measures are assembled from accompanying investment documentation (this might be national or ministerial), and taxation measures are recorded with as much granularity as is available. Policy titles, descriptions, dates, values, and sources are all recorded.






## B. Categorise policies using Oxford taxonomy

Each recorded policy is categorised into one of 40 archetypes (e.g., “clean energy investment”) and one of 200+ sub-archetypes (for clean energy, there are 9 sub-archetypes: new renewable energy, new transmission, etc). Archetypes are operational-type (i.e. ongoing spending) or discretionary (i.e. new investment). Sub-archetypes are mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive, of the same ‘level’, and suitably granular for relevant social, development, and environmental impact measures. The taxonomy is extended from the peer-reviewed methodology document of the Global Recovery Observatory,<sup>27</sup> and builds on a subset of archetypes employed in an April 2020 survey of 230 leading global economists.<sup>28</sup>

Operational archetypes	Discretionary archetypes
A Core government operations	α Core government service expansion
B Health	β Health (discretionary)
C Education	γ Education (discretionary)
D Socio-cultural programs	δ Socio-cultural programs (discretionary)
E Traditional energy	ε Traditional energy (discretionary)
F Clean energy	ζ Clean energy (discretionary)
G Traditional transportation	η Traditional transportation (discretionary)
H Clean and/or resilient transportation	θ Clean and/or resilient transportation (discretionary)
I Communications	ι Communications (discretionary)
J Other utilities	κ Other utilities (discretionary)
K Military	λ Military (discretionary)
L Emergency response services	μ Emergency response services (discretionary)
M Natural capital, parks, and forestry	ν Natural capital, parks, and forestry (discretionary)
N Worker retraining and job creation	ξ Agriculture and fisheries
O Social welfare / social security	ο Disaster preparedness investment
P Other traditional operations	π Green housing and real estate
Q Other clean and/or resilient operations	ρ Traditional housing and real estate
	σ Materials
	τ Other large-scale infrastructure
	υ General R&D
	φ Clean R&D
	χ Other traditional investment
	ψ Other clean and/or resilient investment

## C. Run automatic assessment of policies

Every sub-archetype is associated with eleven potential impact scores, calibrated to each country context, and covering social, development, and environmental factors (including short- and long-term GHGs, air pollution, natural capital, and adaptation/resilience). The scores are based on the latest in global scientific and socio-economic understanding. By their nature, the scores are directional and flexible—they intend to provide a broad overview of a nation’s policy landscape.




<sup>27</sup> O’Callaghan, B. (2021). *Global Recovery Observatory: Draft Methodology Document*. OUERP.

<sup>28</sup> Hepburn, C. et al. (2020). *Will COVID-19 fiscal recovery packages accelerate or retard progress on climate change?*. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 36, No. S1. (2020).

Oxford is grateful to the support of donors including (alphabetically) the Children’s Investment Fund Foundation, ClimateWorks Foundation, Green Fiscal Policy Network, H2020-MSCA-RISE project GEMCLIME-2020 GA No. 68122, Oxford Martin School, Rhodes Trust, United Nations Development Program, and United Nations Environment Programme, and the Climate Compatible Growth Programme of the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). Their support enables Oxford to lead the SBA initiative. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views or official policies of any donor groups.


## D. Determine superior policies

Using the impact-scores and accompanying descriptions of sub-archetypes, policymakers can find alternative policies that have the same development (or other desirable) outcomes without the environmental or social costs. In its current state, the sub-archetypes are linked to 8,000 example policies from the COVID-19 fiscal response. Over time, with appropriate funding, this will expand to include and compare significantly more policies from across Africa.



## E. Learn from other countries

Much like the Global Recovery Observatory, which tracks and compares global COVID-19 spending across nations, in the future, the SBA could incorporate live global comparisons of spending. For policymakers, this could facilitate direct policy learning across regions.



## 5. KEY MESSAGES

1. **The SBA helps policymakers understand the potential development, social, and environmental impacts of their budget decisions**

*African nations are missing opportunities to use their limited fiscal space to accelerate development and climate action. The SBA provides a step towards action, making leading environmental and socio-economic science accessible to policymakers to guide sustainable development. The approach is adaptable—it can be calibrated based on policymaker needs and country context.*

2. **Adopting the SBA could strengthen the PFM foundation for progress towards Agenda 2030 and Agenda 2063**

*By combining science with socio-cultural perspectives, the approach can integrate sustainable planning processes into public financial management. In so doing, it could contribute directly to SDGs 1, 7, 8 and 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 17.*

3. **More efficient and effective fiscal management, aligned with Agenda 2030, could attract increased external financing in support of national development objectives**

*Getting from “billions to trillions”<sup>11</sup>, as envisaged in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA), requires scaled up contributions from all financial stakeholders. Support from development finance institutions (DFIs), and even parts of the private sector, can be*

*dramatically increased with transparent and effective systems of public finance. For many donor countries, there is a political imperative to support climate action and sustainable growth pathways—adopting the SBA could demonstrate positive progress in Africa.*

**This document will introduce ARFSD participants to the SBA, facilitate new interactions on pathways to align national budgeting with sustainable and inclusive growth objectives, and hopefully lead to new SBA piloting programs across the continent.**