

Study on the Interlinkages between the Development, Peace and Security, Human Rights and Humanitarian Pillars in Eastern Africa

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1. Introduction

This study focuses on and interrogates the inter-linkages of four pillar issues, namely, development, peace and security, human rights, and humanitarian issues in Eastern Africa. Based on the ECA geographical definition of Eastern Africa, the study will cover Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. The study will also cover the policy initiatives and activities of regional integration and cooperation in Eastern Africa whose policy initiatives and activities have direct implications for the four pillars. The regional bodies include the East African Community (EAC), Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). Due to transborder issues and regional dynamics, including the membership of IGAD, the study will also cover Sudan in areas and on issues relevant to the four pillars.

The study identifies and analyses the key issues and interactions among these pillars in Eastern Africa, as well as identifying challenges and opportunities for harnessing the inter-linkages, and promoting synergies and complementary implementation of interventions and programmes addressing conflict and related situations in the subregion. This is necessitated by the search for more inclusive, sustainable, and effective solutions to armed conflicts and insecurity and persistent development challenges in the subregion. In interrogating the inter-linkages to effectively address conflict and development situations in the subregion, the study will mainstream youth and gendered dimensions as crosscutting policy issues. The study also examine COVID-19 and its impact, including the socio-economic, health and humanitarian responses to COVID-19 by member States with the support of relevant agencies, on the interlinkages and the complementary implementation of interventions across the four pillars in the subregion.¹

It also analyses the transboundary dimensions of the pillars and their inter-linkages to promote intraregional cooperation in the search for sustainable and lasting solutions. It will explore existing policy instruments and tools for harnessing the interlinkages, and capacity development challenges in relation to mainstreaming the inter-linkages into policy and strategies, including those related to Agenda 2030 and 2063. Informed by its findings, the study will present robust conclusions and generate action-oriented recommendations for advancing collaboration and complementary implementation.

The study also contributes to a continental assessment of the inter-linkages of the four pillars led by the United Nations Office for the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA). The Eastern Africa report will contribute to the broader objective of accelerating the integrated implementation of Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development through enhanced capacity of African Union organs and agencies, and Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Target audience including member States, the African Union, and relevant RECs and IGOs in the subregion, including EAC, IOC, IGAD, ICGLR, ECA-SRO Eastern Africa. Secondary beneficiaries include national and regional civil society groups/networks, the SDG Centre for Africa (Rwanda), researchers and academic think-tanks, media, the African Peer Review Mechanism Secretariat (and relevant country assessment missions), etc.

¹ The consultant will leverage extant analyses on COVID-19 in Eastern Africa by the ECA, including the strategies adopted by national governments, range of impacts, lessons learnt, and how to build back better.

This study responds to the increasing global, continental, and regional consensus among research, policy and practice institutions in relation to the need to promote coherence in addressing structural vulnerabilities, including development, human rights, humanitarian and peace and security challenges over the past decade. The nature of armed conflict and insecurity has exacerbated humanitarian, development and human rights challenges, and the interactions amongst them. Their impacts on structural stability continue to evolve and change rapidly over the past decade. Indeed, armed conflicts have become more protracted, prolonged, more vicious (violent) against civilians and more regionalised and internationalised. This has increased the complexities of armed conflict interlinkages with other pillars, creating fused (inter-linked) risks and consequences. There is a growing recognition that interventions have a better chance of creating the conditions for sustaining peace if they simultaneously address the humanitarian, development, human rights, and security needs of aggrieved communities.

Harnessing the inter-linkages among the pillars is seen as central to preventing and resolving armed conflicts and insecurity and building and sustaining peace. The recognition of this fused dimension (interlinkages of the four pillars) is already embedded in the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development and Africa's Agenda 2063. Recent policy initiatives also underscore this new reality, including Resolutions by the UN General Assembly and Security Council in April 2016 (Resolutions 70/262 and 2282) on sustaining peace by building an inclusive, common vision of society, and ensuring coherence and synergies across the four pillars. In addition, the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit noted that humanitarian assistance alone cannot resolve protracted crises, and highlighted the need for a "New Way of Working", including the need for improved collaboration between humanitarian and development actors as imperative for reducing needs, risk, and vulnerability. The World Bank's Pathways to Peace of 2018 also emphasized new thinking about the relationship of development, peace, and security in strategies for inclusive conflict prevention. Also, the UN Secretary-General António Guterres has placed sustainable peace at the top of his agenda and is rolling out his vision for a UN capable of preventing conflict and integrating development, human rights, and peace and security approaches.

1.1. Scope (coverage) of Countries

In line with the study objectives and the Terms of Reference, the study covers 14 countries, including Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. All the listed countries (except Sudan) are covered UNECA Subregional Office for Eastern Africa (SRO-EA).²

1.2. Operationalisation of Key Concepts (Pillars)

1.2.1. Development

This study operationalises development in line with the expanded approach of Amartya Sen's concept of development as "Freedom" and "Capability"³, and the Brundtland Commission's notion of

² See <https://www.uneca.org/sro-ea>

³ Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

‘Sustainable Development’.⁴ Amartya Sen’s approach transcends the traditional focus on economic growth and its variables to include human development issues linked to the expression and fulfilment of human freedom, the removal of impediments to freedoms such as poverty, discrimination, inequalities, absence of social services, lack of economic opportunities, social exclusion, armed conflicts, large scale violence and other forms of physical insecurity. Poverty and mainstream economic issues are only one component of development, rather than its totality. Here, poverty and economic underdevelopment the deprivation of capabilities, rather than mere lowness of income. The conditions leading to constraint to freedom are, by nature, subjective. Therefore, the input must come through a democratic and participatory process following a bottom-up approach, rather than from statistics.

The idea of sustainable development integrates economic advancement with environmental protection, a framework for combining environmental policies with development strategies. The Brundtland Commission defines it as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.⁵ It allows for adapting strategies for addressing sources and symptoms of environmental degradation with the creation of socio-economic opportunities and incentives for economic advancement. The more recent formulation of sustainable development as contained in the UN Agenda 2030 and the AU Agenda 2063 expand the concept into three components, namely economic, social, and environmental aspects. The economic issues includes build economic growth, address unemployment (provide job opportunities) and tackle poverty; the social aspects include empowering women and girls, and widen access to education, health, and social protection; and the environmental aspect includes addressing climate change and environmental protection.⁶

The expanded approach to development represents the mainstream thinking and approach by major policy actors since the late 1990s, and it is consistent with global and regional development initiatives in Eastern Africa. The UN’s Agenda 2030 and the AU’s Agenda 2063 all embed key human development aspirations and goals. The subregional development framework also reflects the expanded approach, including IGAD’s identification of agriculture, natural resources, and environment; peace and security, and disaster resilience as key priorities of its strategy for 2016-2020. The IGAD strategy also incorporates the AU’s Agenda 2063 and UN’s SDGs initiative.⁷

Development is used here to encompass orthodox macro-economic measures of growth rates, investments and fiscal stability; access to basic social services and poverty alleviation; democracy, human rights and civil liberties; reasonable level of security; and good governance virtues (accountability, transparency, etc.).⁸ This conception is consistent with the study objectives (as contained in the Terms of Reference). Sen’s approach is relevant for this study because of its emphasis on the ‘human’, as opposed to the single-level analysis of macro-economic trends and patterns. This makes it consistent with human security concerns, including a broader definition of threats to

⁴ Kono N. (2014) Brundtland Commission (World Commission on Environment and Development). In: Michalos A.C. (eds) Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0753-5_441

⁵ United Nations General Assembly. (1987). Report of the world commission on environment and development: Our common future. Oslo, Norway: United Nations General Assembly, Development, and International Co-operation: Environment, p.43.

⁶ See UNDESA, “Social Development for Sustainable Development”, <https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/2030agenda-sdgs.html>

⁷ See IGAD (2016) IGAD Regional Strategy: The Framework, Vol. 1, Djibouti: IGAD Secretariat, pp. 25-27.

⁸ See Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, pp. 13-34.

populations, including humanitarian emergencies, human rights issues, and peace and security challenges. The mainstream profile of this approach gives it a congruence with extant data and datasets such as the UNDP Human Development indicators.

Based on this conception, and initial assessment of extant development data and trends for Eastern Africa, this study will explore the following development issues/indicators: macro-economic issues, including economic growth trends and patterns; government revenue and expenditure patterns, including social spending; investment flows and patterns; agriculture; patterns of outputs and contributions to production, and risks of shocks; socio-economic inequality; poverty trends (over extended period, especially before, during and post-conflict); human capital development issues, including literacy and employment patterns; natural resource issues, including issues of ownership, control, and distribution of receipts.

1.2.2. Peace and Security

This study defines peace and security in line with the AU's Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council. The Protocol under Articles 3 (objectives) and 6 (functions) outlines the components of peace and security to include protection and preservation of life and property, the well-being of population and the environment; creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development; anticipation and prevention of armed conflicts, including promoting democratic practices, good governance, and the rule of law, protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law, as part of efforts for preventing conflicts; peace-related activities in the event of conflicts, including peace-making, peace support operations, post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding; combat transnational security challenges, including violent extremism and terrorism; and the prevention and management of humanitarian and disaster emergencies.

This definition already embeds linkages with development, humanitarian, and human rights as the basis for preventing conflicts and building peace and resilience. The operationalisation covers the latent and manifest aspects, and the structural dimensions of peace and security. In particular, the structural aspects speak to the need for multi-dimensional approaches to conflict prevention through emphasis on development, human rights, and humanitarian issues.

This definition is consistent with those adopted by relevant regional bodies in Eastern Africa, including IGAD and EAC. For instance, the 1996 Agreement Establishing IGAD (Article 7) emphasizes the promotion of "peace and stability in the region and create mechanisms within the region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter-State and intra-State conflicts through dialogue."⁹ The IGAD's 2016-2020 Regional Strategy also highlights a broader definition of peace and security as one of the four areas of cooperation, and highlights its strategic priorities to include conflict early warning and early response; preventive diplomacy and mediation, transnational security threats; governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights; humanitarian affairs; and gender equality and women empowerment.¹⁰ The EAC Treaty and its Protocols on Peace and Security (2006), and Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism (2012) pinpoint the interdependence between peace and security, and socio-economic development, humanitarian and environmental issues, and democracy and human rights. The EAC protocol on Peace and Security defines core priorities to include conflict prevention, management and resolution; prevention of genocide; combating terrorism;

⁹ IGAD (1996) Agreement on Establishing the IGAD, p.7, <http://www.gsdr.org/docs/open/regional-organisations/igad,%201996,%20establishing%20agreement.pdf>

¹⁰ IGAD (2016) Regional Strategy Vol 1: The Framework, p. 47, <https://igad.int/documents/8-igad-rs-framework-final-v11/file>

combating piracy; peace support operations; disaster risks management and response; management of refugees; control of small arms and light weapons; combating transnational crimes; and addressing cattle rustling among others.¹¹

Based on initial exploration of extant data, and the core priorities of IGAD's 2016-2020 Regional Strategy and the EAC's Protocol on Peace and Security, the study will collect and analysis data on the following key elements/indicators in the analysis of peace and security in Eastern Africa: armed conflict and violent clashes; socio-political tensions; insecurity as it relates to violent attacks against civilians; protests and riots; activities of militias and non-state state armed groups; and transnational violent extremist groups.

1.2.3. Human Rights

Human rights are inalienable provisions and allowances inherent to all persons irrespective of race, age, sex, ethnicity, religion, language, etc. The operationalisation of human rights in this study is situated in the 1981 African Charter on Human and People's Rights that recognises and provides for a range of civil, political, economic, and cultural rights. The African Charter expressly notes that it is "...essential to pay particular attention to the right to development and that civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social and cultural rights in their conception as well as universality and that the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights."¹² The African Charter provides for social and economic rights such as right to own property (Art. 14), right to work (Art. 15), right to enjoy physical and mental health (Art. 16), right to education and cultural life of a community (Art. 17) and right to economic, social and cultural development (Art. 22). In addition there are provisions for civil and political rights such as equality of persons (Art. 19), right to life and integrity (Art. 4), right to liberty and security of persons (Art. 6), right to fair hearing (Art.7), freedom of association and free assembly (Art.10-11), right to political participation and equal access to public services (Art. 13), etc.

In line with the objectives of the study (Terms of Reference), the history of Eastern Africa, and initial exploration of extant data, the study will focus on the following indicators/aspects of human rights: rule of law in relation to arbitrary arrests and detention, and torture; freedom of expression and Press freedom; free and fair election Political participation; religious and political freedoms.

1.2.4. Humanitarian

This study operationalises humanitarian issues to include incidence and impacts of natural disasters and human emergencies (e.g. linked to armed conflicts, political tensions, and inter-group violence) leading to displacements and dislocations. This definition incorporates inter-linkages between humanitarian crises and other pillars of this study, especially peace and security and development; for instance, where armed violence and insecurities; drought, famine and floods; unemployment, food scarcity, and pandemics trigger internal and cross-border displacements. This definition is consistent with the 1991 UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 46/182 that identified the victims of natural disasters and other disasters are key targets of humanitarian assistance.¹³ The UNGA resolution

¹¹ See Article 2 of EAC Peace and Security Protocol, <http://eacgermany.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/EAC-PROTOCOL-ON-PEACE-AND-SECURITY.pdf>

¹² See Preamble of the 1981 African Charter on Human and People's Rights, <https://www.achpr.org/legalinstruments/detail?id=49>

¹³ See UNGA Res 46/182 (1991), <https://undocs.org/A/RES/46/182>

further mentions the relationships between emergency, rehabilitation and development (paragraph 9), as well as the links between economic growth and sustainable and the prevention and preparedness against emergencies (paragraph 10).

The definition is also appropriate for the focus countries; for instance, the AU Humanitarian Policy Framework emphasizes early warning, preparedness and response, protection and assistance to victims and vulnerable groups, protection of civilians in armed conflicts, disaster management and risk reduction, inclusive peace process and post-conflict reconstruction and development as core priorities.¹⁴

The definition also aligns with 2016 IGAD Regional Strategy that placed resilience and prevention as core priorities of its disaster risk management strategy. The IGAD strategy recognises the multiple sources and manifestations of shocks and vulnerabilities in member-states, and notes the ability to identify, address and reduce risk; and improved social and economic conditions of vulnerable populations as key to disaster management and risk reduction.¹⁵ The resilience-based approach makes humanitarian issues a cross-cutting theme with those of other pillars of this study.

In line with the objectives of the study (Terms of Reference) and initial exploration of extant data, the key humanitarian issues/indicators to be covered in the focused countries are as follows: internal displacement and refugees; pandemics; natural disasters e.g. droughts, famine, locust, and flood; food security; and population pressures and resource scarcity.

1.3. Analytical Template

The study recognises the four pillars to be equally constituted and are inter-dependent. To this extent, the four pillars are treated equally in terms of data collection and coverage (as operationalised above). In line with the reading of the history of the focused countries, and the initial exploration of extant data, the study will use human security (preventing and resolving violent conflicts) as the analytical pivot. Conceptually, human security speaks to debates in the 1990s following the publication of the 1994 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) annual report, which raised the critical question of rethinking the intellectual and policy content of security. The report noted that as civil conflicts became common, there was a trade-off between inter and intra-state conflicts; that feelings of insecurity arise from daily existential issues of hunger, deprivation, gender-based violence, religious and ethnic persecution and repressions by the state and regimes, as opposed to a cataclysmic world event or the international system.¹⁶ The debate triggered the recognition of non-military “threats” to states and citizens to include the political problems of economic dislocation, political violence, displacement and refugees, and environmental degradation amongst others. The report lists seven areas of potential concern for security — economics, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. It also lists the main threats to these new security issues to be unchecked population growth, disparities in economic opportunities, migration pressures,

¹⁴ See 2015 AU Humanitarian Policy Framework, <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/humanitarian-policy-framework-rev-final-version.pdf>

¹⁵ See IGAD (2016), Regional Strategy Vol 1, p. 27.

¹⁶ See UNDP (1994) Human Development Report 1994. See also United Nations Commission on Human Security (UNCHS) (2003) Human Security Now, New York: UN.

environmental degradation, drug trafficking, and international terrorism.¹⁷ The debate established two elements of human security, namely, freedom-from-fear and freedom-from-want. The former emphasizes physical safety of populations from violence and natural disasters, and the latter encompasses socio-economic, cultural, and human rights issues.¹⁸

In the context of this study, human security is operationalised as processes and interventions for preventing and resolving conflict more sustainably. It speaks to issues at the core of structural causes (prevention) of conflicts, including those highlighted as elements of the four pillars e.g. inequality, poverty, poor human capital development, lack of political participation, displacements, and resource scarcity, etc. It also speaks to issues associated with active conflict prevention and resolution such as effective responses to natural disasters (drought, famine, locust invasion, etc.), free and fair elections, protection of civilians, and formal peace processes. The end goal of harnessing the inter-linkages among the four pillars and promoting synergies and complementary implementation of interventions and programmes is more systematic and sustainable prevention and resolution of violent conflicts in Eastern Africa subregion.

The operationalisation of human security as conflict prevention and resolution in Eastern Africa is consistent with the EAC's Protocol on Peace and Security (Articles 3a and 4) that identifies conflict prevention, management, and resolution as a key of cooperation and priority issue. This is also reinforced by the IGAD Strategy 2016-2020 which identifies the core priorities of its peace and security agenda to include conflict early warning and early response, preventive diplomacy and mediation, humanitarian issues, and gender equality.¹⁹ This study uses the EAC's definition of conflict as "a disagreement through which the parties involved perceive a threat to their needs, interests or concerns."²⁰ A conflict becomes violent when parties resort to the use of physical or psychical force to pursue or defend their needs and interests.

The study defines conflict prevention in line with the AU's approach as a direct and operational focus of intervening before violence occurs as well as a systematic, strategic focus of addressing the root, proximate, and structural causes of conflict.²¹ It has two components; operational prevention – interventions to address immediate causes of conflict or to de-escalate a given conflict –, and structural prevention which involves efforts to reduce the risk or likelihood of conflict and violence with positive incentives for societies that strengthen their resilience and provide access to political, economic, social and cultural opportunities.²² This two dimensions reflect the role of a diverse range of issues, including the four pillars, in the outbreak and efforts at preventing and resolving conflict in Eastern Africa.

¹⁷ Smith, S (2005) 'The Contested Concept of Security' in Booth, K (ed) *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner: 27- 62.

¹⁸ Suhrke, A. (1999) "Human Security and the Interests of States", *Security Dialogue* 30(September): 265-276. See also, Knudsen, O. (2004) "Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization", *Security Dialogue* Vol. 32(3): 355.

¹⁹ See IGAD (2016), *Regional Strategy Vol 1*, p. 27.

²⁰ See EAC (2012) 'East African Community Conflict Management Act 2012', p. 2.

https://www.eala.org/uploads/EAC_Conflict_Management_Act_2012.pdf

²¹ This is in line with the AU APSA Roadmap 2016-2020. See African Union Commission, *African Peace and Security Architecture: APSA Roadmap 2016-2020*, December 2015, www.peaceau.org/uploads/2015-en-apsa-roadmap-final.pdf.

²² Carvalho, G. (2017), 'Conflict Prevention: What's in it for the AU', *Policy Brief 103*, ISS/TFP, p. 2.

https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ISS_Africa-policybrief103.pdf


It defines conflict resolution as “ a wide range of methods of addressing sources of conflict and of finding means of resolving or containing it in less destructive form.”²³ This extends the use of tools and instruments for preventing and managing conflict for also addressing the root causes (structural issues) of conflict in Eastern Africa. The study explores inter-linkages at two levels’ first is the exploration of two-pillar interlinkages in relation to conflict prevention and resolution. This produces six combinations (interlinkages listed as follows:

- 1) Humanitarian-Human Rights interlinkages: it explores how the nexus of humanitarian and human rights issues produce outcomes that impact the risk of conflict and the prospects of conflict prevention and resolution in Eastern Africa. Based on extant data and desk review, the study will highlight key issues at the nexus of this interlinkage for Eastern Africa. For instance, how do displacement, food insecurity and natural disasters affect conflict risks, or shape conflict prevention and resolution?
- 2) Humanitarian-Development interlinkages: It explores how the nexus of humanitarian and peace and security issues produce outcomes that affect the risk of conflict, and the prospect of resolving violent conflicts in Eastern Africa subregion. Based on extant data and desk review, the study will highlight key issues at the nexus of this interlinkages for Eastern Africa. For instance, how does the intersection of displacement, natural disasters, poor human capital, food insecurity and poverty produce violent conflicts or could reduce the risk of violence in Eastern Africa?
- 3) Humanitarian-Peace and Security interlinkages: This explores the intersection of humanitarian and peace and security issues produce violent conflicts, or how humanitarian interventions modulate the risk of violent conflicts in Eastern Africa.
- 4) Human Rights – Development interlinkages: This will examine the nexus of human rights and development issues in relation to conflict prevention and resolution in Eastern Africa subregion. For instance, it could investigate how human rights violations and socio-economic inequalities and poverty affect the risk of violent conflict, or how addressing human rights and development issues mitigate the risk of armed conflict in Eastern Africa.
- 5) Human Rights – Peace and Security interlinkages: This interrogates the nexus of human rights and peace and security issues, and how it increases or decreases the risk of violent conflict, and the prospect of conflict prevention and resolution in Eastern Africa subregion. For instance, it could explore how human rights violations, lack of political participation or disputed elections cause violent conflicts, or how peace processes are used to prevent conflict relapse or address human rights issues.
- 6) Development – Peace and Security interlinkages: This will explore the intersection of development and peace and security issues in relation to the existence of violent conflicts, or in efforts at preventing and resolving violent conflicts in Eastern Africa.

For each of these linkages, the study will provide regional overview, highlighting key issues at the nexus, and select events/countries as case study(s) to deepen the analysis in Eastern Africa. The study will also map the range of institutions and policy initiatives and interventions relevant to each of the six combinations (interlinkages) of the four pillars.

Figure 1.0: Human Security (conflict prevention and resolution) as Analytical Pivot

²³ EAC Conflict Management Act 2012, p. 10.



The second level of analysis is the four-pillar interlinkages in Eastern Africa. Based on desk review and using specific case studies, the study will select three issues/case studies that demonstrate the intersection of the four pillars in the outbreak of violent conflict, or in efforts at preventing and resolving violent conflicts in Eastern Africa. Potential case studies include DRC, Somalia, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Burundi and Kenya and will involve exploring the intersection of issues of displacement, human trafficking and organised crime, food security, militias and non-state armed groups, inequality, elections, and peace processes in relation to conflict outbreak and the prospect of conflict prevention and resolution. The analysis of the case studies will also entail institutional frameworks and policy initiatives available at the national, subregional, and regional levels that seek to mainstream the four pillars or could be utilized to deliver approaches that reflect the interlinkages.

Across the two levels of analysis, the study will include reflections on youth and women issues, the impact(s) of COVID-19 on the interlinkages, the range of stakeholders in the respective pillars, and the transboundary/transregional dimensions of the interlinkages.

The use of human security (conflict prevention and resolution) as the analytical pivot is intended to simplify the analysis (reduce complexities). Also, the definition of the four pillars already embeds analytical possibilities for exploring how the highlighted issues can impact the risk of conflicts, and the prospect of conflict prevention and resolution. Moreover, conflict prevention is increasingly mainstreamed into development, human rights, peace and security, and humanitarian policies and strategies at national, regional, and global levels. Finally, the history of Eastern Africa since the 1990s also points to the salience of violent conflicts (imperative of conflict prevention and resolution) as its impact development, human rights, and humanitarian dynamics. peace and security issues as the major driver of regional cooperation and integration, as well as being the most important factor in development, human rights, and humanitarian challenges.

2. Overview of regional trends of the Four Pillars

[TO BE DEVELOPED FURTHER]

2.1. Peace and security Pillar

According to the Mo Ibrahim database of the state of African governance, the main peace and security issues in the greater Eastern Africa in the last ten years has been violence against civilian followed by armed conflict. Only three countries out of the 14 Eastern Africa states has shown improvement in the level of violence against civilian in the last ten years, which are Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Mauritius. Countries that have been too hostile for civilians include in decreasing order: Burundi, DR Congo, Sudan, Somalia, Madagascar, and Kenya. While civilians in Burundi, Sudan and Kenya are more likely to be attacked by their government, civilians in Burundi, Congo, Somalia, Madagascar, and Sudan are more likely to be attacked by non-state actors. Hence, there is no uniform trend as to the sources of civilian attack even if violence against civilian is the most persistent trend across Eastern Africa in the last ten years. Indeed, the deterioration of the capacity to govern in eight out of the 14 countries goes parrel with the rise of attack against civilians by non-state actors and hence there seems to be no way out for peace outside some form of authoritative and yet benign governance.

2.2. Human Rights

To the extent that violence against civilians is the main issues of the past ten years, the right to life would be the key human rights issue which is included under the peace and security pillar. At secondary level, the culture of respect for rights is increasingly eroded in Eastern Africa. The Mo Ibrahim category of rights include personal liberties, freedom of expression and belief, media freedom, digital freedom, protection against discrimination. Ten countries of Eastern Africa have shown a deteriorating respect for rights in the last ten years, the worst being Burundi and Tanzania. It is interesting not that off all the above indicators of rights, protection against discrimination has shown deterioration only in a handful of states, namely Ethiopia, Mauritius and Madagascar while in the other indicators at least half of the states registered a deterioration. This, however, does not mean that protection from discrimination is relatively better in these countries; it is rather because some countries like Burundi and DR Congo were not able to protect their citizens against discrimination for extended period of time and hence their result remained constant.

2.3. Humanitarian Issues

The key problem in the humanitarian category has to do with displacement followed by natural disaster. Both internal and international displacement is not only very high but also increasing. According to Global Internal Displacement Database²⁴, the total stock of internally displacement people in Eastern Africa has increased from about 12.5 million people in 2017 to well above 15.3 million people. The data also indicate that the largest number of these people are displaced in Eastern Africa due to conflicts in these states, which connects the above narrative that violence against civilian increasing the displacement level. In the last three years alone more than 10 million people have been newly displaced in the region due to conflict, which means that the increase in the total stock of displaced people is due to new displacement that were caused by conflict in the region. Likewise, the number of international migrants has been increasing in the last ten years. According to data of the United Nation Department of Economic and Social Affairs, there were 4.8 million refugees in Eastern Africa in 2010 which increased to 6.7 million after five years. By the end of 2019 the number has climbed up to 7.9 million people.²⁵ What all this points to is that displacement has been the key

²⁴ [Global Internal Displacement Database | IDMC \(internal-displacement.org\)](https://www.internal-displacement.org/)

²⁵ [United Nations Population Division | Department of Economic and Social Affairs](https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/)

humanitarian problem and that the biggest contributory factors for this has been conflicts that mostly targets civilian. That said problem related to pandemics and other natural disaster also wreak havoc on the region though their outbreak does not seem to be as systemic as the conflict generated displacement.

1.4. The Development Pillar

The region does not seem to have a single overriding developmental problem when viewed through the lens of conflict prevention. In some country like Kenya inequality and corruption seems to be the main developmental challenges whereas in countries such as South Sudan ad DR Congo the developmental issues seem to be the management of the economy in almost all its macro and micro dimensions. Though at some stage foreign investment, mainly investment in land, has been a source of concern, it seems to fade away from the public agenda. In some countries the exploitation of nature resources including oil and other mineral resources seems to be an issue. Rwanda, Kenya and DR Congo seem to have this issue as an agenda. Hence, there does not seem to be a single overriding regionwide problem in the developmental arena. Additional analyses of the regional context of development issues is provided in Section 6 (COVID-19 Impacts).

3. Interlinkages of the Four Pillars and Conflict Dynamics (1)

3.1. The Human Rights-Peace and Security Interlinkage

In terms of its peace and security ramification, the main regional human rights issue in Eastern Africa seems to be inability or failure to ensure the rule of law through a strong and yet disciplined state. In almost all countries of the region in which violation huma rights is implicated in peace and security issues, the absence of rule of law is the main issues. The challenge of ensuring the rule of law in the region emanates from two sources: lack of political will to respect the rule of law; and lack of capacity to upheld it even when there is the demonstrated will. The case of Somalia provides some illustrations of how human rights and peace and security issues are interlinked.

Somalia Case Study

Except for a brief post-impence period, Somalia has always been in crisis of one form or the other, which eventually led to the complete and protracted collapse of the state. Issues at the nexuses of human rights and peace and security has been at the core of the country`s crises. Before the collapse of the state in 1991, it was state repression and state violence that led to armed conflict and state collapse. Though the nature of crisis and the actors involved thereof changed in the post-1991 period, trajectories of state failure and conflict was similarly driven by issues that are at the intersection of human rights violation and generalized insecurity. The interaction of these factors and their ramification for conflict escalation/prevention is manifested in several forms.

To begin with, with the collapse of the state and thus the impossibility of institutionalizing rule of law and respect for human rights, various armed groups mushroomed in the country. Often times, these actors which include warlords, clan militias, powerful business actors and government officials have

little interest in the consolidation of the Somalia state that is able to ensure rule of law and protect human rights.²⁶ In fact, their violent profiteering practices precluded the possibility for such eventualities. This situation of lawlessness contributed to the emergence of Islamic Courts that were initially inspired by the need to ensure law and order and preventing criminality.²⁷ Though they were initially effective in heralding some sort of order,²⁸ they eventually metamorphosed into extremist Islamic movements as they invariably enter into confrontation with Somali's moderate voices and external actors. Their radicalization foreclosed any possibility for conflict de-escalation or resolution and hence the military force become the only viable option.

Though these extremists have been finally pushed to the margin through a coordinated effort of AMISOM and allied Somali forces, this military success was not accompanied with the development of institutions and operating procedures that ensure the rule of law and protect basic rights. The Somali government and its political elite responsible for ensuring the rule of law have rather been bedevilled by corruption and infighting. According to one account, 'vote buying' was so common that in the 2016-2017 election close to 20 million dollars has changed hands.²⁹ Moreover, the state formation process and the federal government-member states relation has always been frosty. The state formation process was victim of violent and exclusion as major clan sought to dominate other at the regional level.³⁰ The federal-government-member states relations has also been characterized by contestation due to disagreement over the owner of the respective units. No wonder that a government emerging from these processes fails to build institutions that protect human rights and ensure the rule of law. Even worse the current president's heavy handed approach to potential and actual opponents and his effort at manipulating election at federal member state level further strained the federal government-member states relations needed for a viable political order.³¹ It also limited the possibility of arriving at a political settlement entrenched in a constitution accepted by all major actors, which ultimately attenuate the emergence of a system that protect human rights an prevent conflict.

Moreover, the intersection of human rights and peace and security issues has also been manifested in the various interclan conflicts that at times overlap with and feed into national level tensions. The country has been bedevilled by localized inter clan or even sub-clan tensions and conflicts for the control of local resources. Access to farming or pastureland and water and control over local level administrations has been the drivers of these conflicts. Local level contestants at time align with other national level actors through the resource of which they might commit serious atrocities against weaker groups. The atrocity perpetrated by the majority clan over the minority is one instance of the latter. These conflicts and human rights violations undermine the possibility of emergence of a regime marshal the rule of law for conflict prevention and resolution.

²⁶ Tobias Hagmann (2016) Stabilization, extraversion and political settlement. [Stabilization, Extraversion and Political Settlements in Somalia | Rift Valley Institute](#)

²⁷ Aisha Ahmed, 2015, The security bazaar: Business interest and Islamist power in civil war Somalia. International Security, volume 39, number 3.

²⁸ Ken Menkhaus, 2008, Somalia: a country in peril, a policy nightmare. Enough Strategy paper [somalia_rep090308.pdf \(enoughproject.org\)](#)

²⁹ Jeffrey Gettleman, Feb, 2, 2017, *Fueled by Bribes, Somalia's Election Seen as Milestone of Corruption*. Available [Fueled by Bribes, Somalia's Election Seen as Milestone of Corruption - The New York Times \(nytimes.com\)](#)

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³¹ Michael Woldemariam and Jutta Bakonyi, 'This Year in the Horn of Africa. Retrieved from [Http://Riftvalley.Net/Node/991](http://Riftvalley.Net/Node/991)', (May 2019).

Thus, though Somalia indeed made a number of progress in the past 5 years in fighting Al-Shabaab and setting up institutions, challenges to forge robust constitutional order that respect human rights and ensure societal security has undermined the possibility of eliminating the threats posed by Al-Shabab and other rogue elements. Hence, apart from the, at times, unproductive role of external actors, issues at the intersection of human rights and peace and security will shape the possibilities of conflict preventions and resolution in the country.

3.2. The Human Rights-Development Interlinkage

Key issues at the interface of human rights and development in the greater Eastern Africa seems to be the use of the machinery of the state to unfairly exclude competitors and penalize those who resisted such an outcome. Using the state power as instrument of selective exclusion and inclusion indeed seems to be a source contestation in almost all states of Eastern Africa including those that do not experience an escalation of conflict. The case of Burundi where struggle for power was waged in a background of widespread poverty provide an illustration of this.

Burundi Case Study

The post-2015 Burundian crisis illustrates how a dynamic interaction between human rights repression, poverty and economic crisis obstructed the quest for durable peace in the country. For much of its history Burundi has been reeling in ethnic massacre, civil war, and Coup d'état. The country experienced at least eight rounds of ethnic based violence since independence. Though a series of peace agreements in the 2000s herald semblance of stability, it was reversed when a new crisis was precipitated following the late Nkurunziza's decision that he will run for office for a third term in 2015. However, even before this, the country's progress in stabilization and economic reform had been undermined by exclusion and human rights violations. The 2010 election was boycotted by the opposition alleging that governmental repression made free election impossible. When Nkurunziza went further and decided to run for the 2015 election, the country entered a new phase of political crisis undermining the limited gains registered during the earlier period. The opposition called for protests against this decision leading to a series of protests to which the government reacted by arresting, intimidating and harassing protesters. Discontent has also led to an attempted coup aimed at toppling the president from power, which further complicated the situation.

The government equated the apparently peaceful protesters with the coup plotters and thus framed them as enemies that must be decimated. According to the government, the coup plotters are 'criminals' and 'terrorists' that are out there to subvert a legitimate government. And demonstrators are no more different because they are 'accomplice of the putschists', and 'are obstructing investigations into the putsch attempt and deliberately disturbing public order.'³² The most ominous aspect of this has been the youth wing called the Imbonerakure organized by the government. The

³² DW, 2015 Burundi's president warns protesters, praises troops in televised address. [Burundi's president warns protesters, praises troops in televised address | News | DW | 15.05.2015](#)

Imbonerakure has been behind many of the repression and human rights violation against perceived opponents including abductions, torture and killing since the outbreak of the crisis.³³

While the immediate driver of the crisis was the contestation over the decision of Nkurunziza to compete for the third term, deeper driver has economic roots. Political power was sought to acquire economic benefits while excluding competitors. The Burundian state indeed was afflicted with exclusionary currents even before the outbreak of the crisis. The successive reports of the United Nations Secretary General indeed indicate that in spite of progress in a number of areas, the country always run short in protecting human rights and including political opponents in the political processes.³⁴ These elements, which were further exacerbated with the electoral crisis, has already been the deeper sources of instability. Human rights violation and a lack of meaningful development therefore set the context for the escalation of crisis and hindered the quest for viable conflict prevention measures.

The intersection between the human rights and development was not just behind the escalation of the crisis, they are also further worsened by the crisis. The scope of repression and exclusion further worsened while the economy was severely affected by the crisis in the post-2015 period. An economy that has already been dependent on external assistance was seriously affected when external donors withhold their direct budget support. The EU and other major bilateral donors such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland all terminated their bilateral support.³⁵ This combined with the insecurity within the country sharply reduced the rate of growth; depleted the foreign exchange; and discourage investment; and many of the social service were deteriorated.³⁶ Meanwhile a budget constrained government returned into 'voluntary' contribution from the population ostensibly to finance its next election.³⁷ Though these contributions were publicly indicated to be voluntary, all the indication point to their imposed nature. Even when the government declare the practice over, the youth group called Imbonerakure continue to collect these contributions to finance its operation squeezing an already economically stressed population. In 2014 Burundi topped the global hunger index for the third time³⁸ and hence the requirement for contribution from an otherwise destitute people would further worsen their plight.

Accepting international call for negotiation would have paved the way for economic recovery and thus eventually overturning the vicious cycle of repression and economic crisis. However, attempt to organize an inter-Burundian dialogue was stalled due to the government's intransigence and zero-sum mentality.³⁹ The ruling party might have weighted in the economic gains, mostly for the society at large, accrued through compromising with opposition and the political loss that would follow from democratizing the state and protecting human rights. At any rate, Burundi demonstrates a situation

³³ Immigration and refugee Board of Canada, 2018, [Refworld | Burundi: The Imbonerakure, including their activities and their ties to the authorities, specifically with the Bujumbura police: whether they are able to find a person in all parts of the country and abroad or prevent a person from exiting the country \(2015-March 2018\)](#)

³⁴ See, for example Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi [Microsoft Word - 1420526e.doc \(securitycouncilreport.org\)](#); Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi [Etpu \(securitycouncilreport.org\)](#)

³⁵ The Guardian, 2016, [EU suspends aid to Burundi's government | Aid | The Guardian](#)

³⁶ International Crisis Group (2020) A first step towards reform: Ending Burundi's free contribution system. Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°153

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ IWACU English news (10/18/2014). Burundi tops global hunger index. [IWACU English News | The voices of Burundi – Burundi tops Global Hunger Index \(iwacu-burundi.org\)](#)

³⁹ International Crisis Group (2019) Running Out of Options in Burundi Africa Report N°278

in which issues related with economic development and human rights dynamically interact to hinder the possibility for durable peace and conflict resolution.

3.3. The Humanitarian Issue-Development Interlinkage

The main issues of humanitarian and development nexus that are shaping conflict prevention and resolution in Eastern Africa seems to be the interaction between internal and international displacement and patterns of poverty, inequality, and unemployment. The case of Kenya where these factors dynamically interacted to shape conflict prevention and resolution provide an interesting illustration of this.

Kenya Case Study

Kenya has been a linchpin of stability in the Horn of Africa. It has also one of the most vibrant economy in the region. This notwithstanding, Kenya faces challenges to durable peace through conflict prevention that partly emanates from the intersection of humanitarian and development malaise. Though Kenya have been experiencing several humanitarian problems, the key ones in relation to the purpose at hand has to do with internal displacement, refugee, and food insecurity. Internal displacement has been a recurring feature of Kenya since the 1990s driven in the main by electoral related communal violence. According to its second APRM review, by the end of 2007 there were more than 380,000 people that were displaced in the 1990s.⁴⁰ Before these people were re-settled, the 2007/08 election led to the displacement of yet more than 660,000 people.⁴¹ Moreover, as old displacement cases were addressed new one`s emerge due to communal conflicts and other natural disasters. The Government`s effort at disarmament in the North Eastern part of the country in 2009 and 2010 resulted is the displacement of pastoralists adding to the displacement resulting from communal conflicts that are common in these areas. The 2016 drought affecting this part of the country generated relocation of pastoralists. Likewise, Kenya is also one of the countries with the highest number of refugees with over half a million asylum seekers in 2015 from countries such as Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.⁴² Food insecurity driven by a range of natural and manmade factor is also another major humanitarian problem of the country.

In the developmental sphere, Kenya is indeed one of the best performing economy in Eastern Africa with a fairly well managed macro-economic structure and comparatively strong industrial base and service sector.⁴³ However, the country faces major developmental challenges of widening inequality inclusive of gender and regional inequality, a wider level of poverty and high proportion of unemployment. According to Oxfam the richest 10% of Kenyans own 23 time more than the poorest 10% and that this gap between the rich and the poor is widening.⁴⁴ Kenya saw one of the fastest increases in the number of super-rich people.⁴⁵ WB data indicate that in 2016 more than 35% of Kenyans lived below the international poverty line, the large proportion of which were in the rural

⁴⁰ APRM, 2017, Second country review report of the republic of Kenya.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² UNHCR, Kenya, 2020 [Key figures in Kenya \(unhcr.org\)](https://www.unhcr.org/kenya/key-figures)

⁴³ APRM, 2017, Second country review report of the republic of Kenya

⁴⁴ Oxfam International, Kenya, extreme inequality in number, [Kenya: extreme inequality in numbers | Oxfam International](https://www.oxfam.org/kenya/extreme-inequality-in-numbers)

⁴⁵ Ibid.

areas.⁴⁶ Thus, high inequality often with ethno-regional component, high poverty and unemployment create a situation that is ripe for violence. One can also directly discern how the humanitarian issues alluded to above come to interact with these economic problems to mediate dynamics of conflict prevention and resolution in three arenas: electoral violence, communal conflict, and terrorism.

Internal displacement, at least in its main form, reflects already existing peace and security problems while also creating conditions that further exacerbate conflict and complicate conflict resolution through its interaction with and reinforcement of inequality, poverty, and unemployment. Indeed, Kenya find it difficult to decisively institutionalize a system that ensure peaceful, free, and fair election due to a combination of these humanitarian and developmental problems. Though the peaceful nature of the 2013 election led to the expectation that Kenya has finally overcome Africa's ritual of post-election violence, the 2017 election and the subsequent contestations indicate that this may simply be a temporary interregnum. A combination of poverty and large youth unemployment will continue to make it easy for self-aggrandizing politicians to mobilize the youth along ethnic and partisan lines. Moreover, these elections related conflict are not simply tension between political parties. At local level they are also intercommunal since local elites seeks to manipulate electoral outcome to control these local level structures. This is clearly reflected when the newly introduce devolution of power generated the unintended effect of local level power monopolization by the dominant group of the respective county.⁴⁷ It is also reflected when terrorist groups were able to recruit Kenyan nationals in their bid to advance their ideology and cause across Eastern Africa.⁴⁸ Indeed, without the cooperation of Kenyan members of these Islamic groups, a high number of terror attack would not have been perpetrated in the country. That said, the insecurity generated by terrorism is also reinforced by the international displacement in which terrorists easily blend with refugees and therefore operating undetected.

3.4. The Development-Peace and Security Interlinkage

The key issues at the interface of development and peace and security nexus in Eastern Africa seem to be interaction between the way an economy is managed (resource allocation, expenditure, and corruption) and group/identity-based tensions. The interface seems to work in such a way that resource allocation will be skewed to some sectors or groups either intentionally or unintentionally that, in interaction with already existing identity-based tensions, poses challenge to conflict prevention and resolution. South Sudan could be taken as one of the starkest examples of how economic and security problems feed each other to generate conflict and render resolution difficult.

South Sudan Case Study

The key economic problems of the country that contributed to the escalation of the 2013 conflict include the oil dependent nature of the South Sudanese economy, the mismanagement of the revenue generated thereof, and problematic allocation of resources for different sectors and actors. Moreover, the country lacks the necessary infrastructure needed to facilitate economic rejuvenations. South

⁴⁶ WB, 2018, Poverty Incidence in Kenya Declined Significantly, but Unlikely to be Eradicated by 2030

⁴⁷ APRM, 2017, Second country review report of the republic of Kenya

⁴⁸ Duncane Omondi Gumba and Mohamed Daghar, January 2019, Home grown terror a worsening threat for Kenya. [Home-grown terror a worsening threat for Kenya - ISS Africa](#)

Sudan's economy has been highly dependent on oil in which oil accounted for almost all of the country's export and more than 98% its budget.⁴⁹ Hence, the country's economy could easily be affected by the production of oil and fluctuation its price. As though this is not enough the oil revenue was not properly managed, which rather was wasted due to corruption and disproportionate spending on the security sector and other unproductive practices.⁵⁰ South Sudan is one of the most corrupt states. At some point in 2012, the president of the country wrote a letter to his ministers asking them to return the 4 billion dollar they misappropriated.⁵¹ Though they did not do so as requested no body was brought to court for such misappropriation.

In addition to these, other patterns of resource expenditure added to the economic problem of the country and thereby to conflict escalation. The first has to do with the high level of expenditure to a bloated security sector. In 2012, the SPLM had 230,000 soldiers and other 80,000 service men in the police and prison services from which over 600 were Generals, one of the highest in the World.⁵² This security apparatus took 58% of the total expenditure of the country by 2012 which has increased to 75% in the 2014-2018 period.⁵³ Though it was envisaged that the soldiers will be demobilized to reduce the South Sudanese army to 78,000 personnel, this has never happened due to persistent rebellion and the need to appease them through their integration into the army. The government's post-2005 approach for rebellions of disgruntled militias had been their integration into the SPLA eventually creating an incentive for such an act while also inflating the security sector. The country's oil revenue was thus disproportionately spent on the security sector leading to the neglect of the other sectors of the economy. What is left of this was often spent for recurrent expenditure mainly as salary for civil servants who spend it to consume imported luxury goods.⁵⁴ This also means the neglect of other sectors such as health, education and other infrastructure that are necessary to revitalize the non-oil sector of the economy, in the absence of which generated popular frustration over the lack of peace dividend. All these contributed for the outbreak of the crisis by increasing the stake involved in controlling the state apparatus, generating popular frustration, rewarding rebellion, and limiting the capacity and legitimacy of governmental institutions.

This economic and developmental problems, however, were further worsened by the already existing peace and security challenges. Long before the outbreak of the civil war, there were several rebellions and inter-communal conflicts. Local communities often battle each other over access to grazing land and water resources whereas militias disgruntled with the government or dissatisfied with the new dispensation rebel against the government. Many of these conflicts often have ethno-reginal dimensions. The rapid metamorphosis of an otherwise political conflict into ethnic massacre of the Nuer by the ned of 2013 was indicative of the dynamics. Already existing tensions interacting with the economic problems noted above and other governance issues led to the outbreak and subsequent escalation of the South Sudanese civil war.

⁴⁹ Sudan Tribune, December 21, 2016, Sudan and S. Sudan extend oil agreement for three more years. Available <https://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article61190>

⁵⁰ ADB,2018, The Political Economy of South Sudan. [The Political Economy of South Sudan.pdf \(afdb.org\)](#)

⁵¹ Hereward Holland, June 4, 2012, South Sudan officials have stolen \$4 billion: president. [South Sudan officials have stolen \\$4 billion: president | Reuters](#)

⁵² ADB,2018, The Political Economy of South Sudan. [The Political Economy of South Sudan.pdf \(afdb.org\)](#)

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Øystein H. Rolandsen (2015) Another civil war in South Sudan: the failure of Guerrilla Government?, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 9:1, 163-174, DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2014.993210

One's the civil war bakeout, it further affected the economy which in turn feed into the conflict and insecurity. Since the outbreak of the civil war, South Sudan experienced all the textbook cases of economic problems: inflation, rising debt, poverty, and unemployment. By 2015 inflation rose by 550%, which is the highest in the world and only to decline to 117 by the end of 2017.⁵⁵ The main source of this has been food inflation as importing food from neighbouring countries become almost impossible due to the conflict. The conflict has also contributed to rising debt for an economy that was once a surplus economy. By 2016, South Sudan owed borrower 1.4 billion USD and that the level of foreign exchange reserve was sufficient to cover no more than two weeks of import affecting payment of salaries and other exchanges.⁵⁶ Occasionally civil servants work without salary for up to six months which is a source of lack of motivation and resort to other parallel and informal activities. Poverty and other social indicator already further deteriorate in the wake of the civil war. The percentage of the population that are literate is very low, child stunting is widely prevalent, and unemployment of the youth is rampant. Studies indicate that 50% of the youth in the age of 15-24 are unemployed.

Given all these, the continuation of the conflict or at least the formation of localized violence is inevitable. Though the reason identified by existing and emerging violent actor are mostly political related with the division of territory, exclusionary governance, quest for justice for ethnic members, and power struggle, the working of these underpinning economic factors should not be underestimated. Any effort toward resolution of the current crisis would thus need to address many of these economic factors in addition to other security and political measures related to reconciliation, transitional justice, and security sector reform.

3.5. Human Rights-Humanitarian interlinkage

The key humanitarian and human rights issues of the greater Eastern Africa seems to be the interaction of drivers of internal and external displacement and the lack of rule of law. In many of the cases the interlinkage in this regard seems to be first the result of conflict which then feedback into the existing or new conflict dynamics. The case of Ethiopia gives a general impression of how this might work.

Ethiopia Case Study

Post-2018 Ethiopia could be a good example of how human rights violations compounded with humanitarian problems could exacerbate national level contradiction and thus undermine structural conflict prevention measures. The Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) was forced through popular pressure to liberalize the political and economic space as part of which it elected Abiy Ahmed as the chairman of the EPRDF and the Prime minister of the country. Abiy introduced several measures in the hope of liberalizing the political space including release of political prisoners, scrapping the terrorist designation of three of the country's exiled armed opposition groups, amending the repressive laws and ensuring media freedom. However, amidst of all these

⁵⁵ ADB,2018, The Political Economy of South Sudan. [The Political Economy of South Sudan.pdf \(afdb.org\)](#)

⁵⁶ *ibid*

democratizing measures a key component for democratizing the country was lacking: the capacity, and times, the will to ensure the rule of law.

The airing out of previously repressed views would inevitably generate political polarization that will only be constructively handled by holding individuals to account for their (in)action. This, however, was utterly lacking. By Abiy's own admission, let alone protect the basic rights of Ethiopians, he was not even able to protect the safety of his own family members. Consequently, the country experienced several targeted attacks generating massive displacement in different part of the country. In the South, the Guji Oromo attack against neighbouring Gedeo people in 2018 led to the displacement of close to one million people. The regional government of Oromia failed to take measures against perpetrator, which rather tried to prematurely return people back to their original place. The same year, in Burayo, a town close to Addis Ababa, a number non-Oromo resident of the town were killed.⁵⁷ Meanwhile the OLF that was invited to come to country after exile refused to disarm claiming that it was not part of its agreement. When the pressure for disarmament increases the civilian leadership dissociate itself from the military wing, OLF Shene, that decided to wage an insurgency. Since then, robbing banks, killing innocent citizens, abducting, and killing local officials become the *modus operandi* of the group in Western Oromia. More recently it killed several unarmed Amhara in Western Wellega simply because of their ethnicity.

When, Jawar Mohamed, an Oromo media activist who was part of the group that spearheaded the Oromo protest leading to the 2018 reform, claimed that his house was surrounded by government forces, a new round of ethnic pogrom was unleashed against non-Oromo minorities across Oromia. During the incident more than 86 people were killed, property was burned, and large number of people displaced. When all these happen, adequate law enforcement measures were not undertaken. On the other hand, the incidence widened the national level polarization since the people killed across Oromia are mostly from other ethnic groups. Yet another bounce of massacre followed when the popular Oromo singer Hachalu Hundessa was killed in June this year. Angry Oromo mob destroyed billion worth properties, horrendously killed a number of non-Oromos and 'not-Oromo-enough' Oromos.⁵⁸ During the incident some of the Oromo ethnonationalist media even disseminated live angry people calling to exterminate the Neftegna and Amhara.⁵⁹ All these occurrences cannot be viewed in isolation from the inability or unwillingness to ensure the rule of law.

The failure to ensure the rule of law has also led to violence against civilian in other part of the country. In Benishangule Gumuze region the killing and displacement of Amhara and Agew has become a daily occurrence and in Amhara region flashpoints of violence along ethnic lines in 2019 led to the death and displacement. In Southern Nations Regional state communal conflict and ethnic pogroms has occurred on several occasions in the last two years leading to death and displacement. The most notable in this regard is the ethnic pogroms of the Sidama when their referendum of statehood was postponed in July 2019. In Somali Regional State churches were burned and minorities were attacked under the former president Abdi Ille in June 2018. According to the prime minister recent

⁵⁷ ARC Briefing Ethiopia September 2018

⁵⁸ ARC Briefing Ethiopia July 2020

⁵⁹ Endalkachew Chala, 7August,2010, How the murder of musician Hachalu Hundessa incited violence in Ethiopia: Part II. Available at [How the murder of musician Hachalu Hundessa incited violence in Ethiopia: Part II · Global Voices](#)

parliamentary speech, there were more than 113 conflicts in the last two years.⁶⁰ Due to such incidences of violence, in 2019 some 3 million people were displaced in the country.

In the face of the interactive dynamics of human rights violation, violence, and humanitarian disasters, conflict prevention become a difficult undertaking. For one thing, the government and other stakeholders get preoccupied with and detracted by pressing humanitarian concerns. Since the violence and displacement has ethnic dimensions, it also led to national level polarization risking wider level of instability. Since many of the victims in Oromia are Amhara and constituencies of pan-Ethiopian ideology, political organization representing these groups trenchantly criticized the federal and regional government's failure to take adequate measure to prevent impunity. It is not the case that people are not arrested in these cases; it is rather that the arrest did not stop the violence and individuals perceived criminal are left scot free. In one sense this has to do with the weaknesses of the institutions of the rule of law while in other it is their unwillingness. While the elites of the victim group called for the rule of law, Oromo nationalist, on the other hand, accused the government of arresting and repressing the Oromo when it took measures against suspected human rights violators. The result has been a polarized national level dynamic.

The interaction of these national and local dynamics also seems to embolden the Tigray People Liberation Front to provoke the government by attacking the federal army base in Tigray generating yet another 'human rights violation-violence-humanitarian problem' complex in the northern part of the country. In the shadow of the war, a large of number of ethnic Amhara were killed by forces that are reportedly allied with the Tigray People Liberation Front in revenge to their defeat by the special force of Amhara and the federal army in Western Tigray.⁶¹ The war itself generated another humanitarian problems and blatant human rights violation that might fed into further instability.

3.6. Humanitarian-Peace and Security Interlinkage

In terms of their implication for peace and conflict, the main humanitarian issues in the greater eastern Africa are internal and international displacement. At its lowest the number of internally displaced people amounts to 6.3 million in 2019 which dropped from an earlier figure of 8.1 million people previously. The same year the number of refugees constituted 3.5 million people. However, observation indicate that it is not just the number of affected people that shaped the humanitarian-peace and security linkage; it is also the mechanism through which they interact with peace and security issues. In this light the case of Democratic Republic of Congo where refugee and peace and security issues are entangled together provide a good illustration of the interlinkage.

DRC Case Study

The Democratic Republic of the Congo has been in in crisis since the end of Mobutu regime. It has been afflicted with expanding list of armed movements, concentrated mainly in the eastern part of

⁶⁰ House of People Representative 6th year 2nd special meeting, Available at [የህዝብ ተወካዮች ምክርቤት 6ኛ ዓመት የስራ ዘመን 2ኛ ልዩ ስብሰባ- |etv - YouTube](#)

⁶¹ Amnesty International, [Ethiopia: Investigation reveals evidence that scores of civilians were killed in massacre in Tigray state | Amnesty International](#)

the country, fighting against the central government and one another. The government has remained so weak that in the last three decades it was not able to exercise effective sovereignty in parts of the country. The DRC has also been the scene of the world's largest complex humanitarian emergencies. In 2017 alone, more than 4.5 million people were displaced and 13.1 million people were in need of assistance.⁶² Health problems have remained the major challenge of the country often emerging in areas of conflict and insecurity where it would not be possible to undertake active health surveillances and prevention measures. Indeed, there have been time where health workers treating Ebola cases were attacked by militias that held foreigners responsible for the virus.⁶³ In 2019, a measles epidemic infected 320,000 with a death of 6000 people, mostly children. It was also reported that DRC experienced the 11th Ebola outbreak, one of the most persistent health challenges of the country.⁶⁴ The DRC therefore is a country in which humanitarian crisis and social insecurities formed a vicious circle: where conflict led to humanitarian crisis and the latter in turn making conflict prevention a difficult undertaking. A glance at the cartography and actors of violence indicate how humanitarian and security issues are entangled together making the resolution of the crisis and the institutionalization of durable peace extremely difficult.

Though armed movements mutate (sometimes forming coalitions and other time fragmenting and at times gaining in strength and other time weakening) eastern part of Congo has never been free from violence in the last three decades. It has rather been afflicted by complex of local and regional armed movements and counter insurgency measures with devastating outcome for the civilian population in general vulnerable sections of society including women and children. The crisis was initially partly driven by the Rwandan genocide that led to the flight of refugees and those implicated in the genocide to the democratic republic of Congo. The *Genociders* used the eastern part of DRC as a base for launching attack against the Rwandan Patriotic Front. Initially, the *Genociders* seamlessly blended with innocent Rwandese that fled the conflict and thus were able to freely operate from the refugee camps. However, as time goes by, the international community began to be aware of their mischief and the Rwandan government began to adopt different strategies aimed at decapitating them. First, Rwanda sought to eliminate the *Genociders* force that metamorphosed into a rebel movement called Democratic Force for the Liberation of Rwanda (DFLR). However, the movement was able to adapt its operation to the exigencies of the period flaunting the numerous attempts to eliminate it.⁶⁵ Rwanda also seemingly supported alternative Tutsi dominated rebels such as M23 that oppose the DFLR though it never admitted that it supports Congolese forces.

Rebels of Uganda mainly the Lord Resistance Army and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) also used part of Congo as an operating arena. Though the LRA seems to be weakened, the ADF, which is the most dominant force of the areas, has been battling the Congolese government.⁶⁶ Though the ADF seems to be the most dominant force, accounts indicate that there are more than 120 armed groups in the country that often attack civilians.⁶⁷ Due to this, even if the United Nation deployed the largest and most expensive peacekeeping forces in the organization's history⁶⁸, violence against civilians and

⁶² Mercy Corps, July 2019, Available at [DR Congo Crisis - DRC Humanitarian Crisis Facts | Mercy Corps](#)

⁶³ WHO, 2019, available at [WHO Ebola responder killed in attack on the Butembo hospital](#)

⁶⁴ DRC Security Council Monthly Forecast, October 2020, Available at [Democratic Republic of the Congo, October 2020 Monthly Forecast : Security Council Report](#)

⁶⁵ NO IMPROVEMENTS IN THE KIVUS MONTHLY REPORT N°32 - JUNE 2020

⁶⁶ UN Security Council Monthly Forecast, December 2020, available at [Democratic Republic of the Congo, December 2020 Monthly Forecast : Security Council Report](#)

⁶⁷ Geneva Academy, 2018. Democratic Republic of Congo: Conflict in the Eastern Regions, the WAR report, available at [Democratic Republic of The Congo Conflict In The Eastern Regions.pdf \(geneva-academy.ch\)](#)

⁶⁸ [A Look at 10 UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa - Africa.com](#)

governmental targets persisted in the eastern part of the country. According to Kivu conflict tracker, there has been 3498 incidents, 5361 kidnappings/abductions, 3971 violent deaths and 9496 victims since 2017 in Kivu alone.⁶⁹

The pattern of linkage between peace and security, and humanitarian issues operate along several lines. First, a humanitarian crisis originating from neighbouring country could interact with a security issues of a home country to lead to a further escalation of a crisis and the emergence of new actors in the conflict scene. Many of the local militia`s emerging in Eastern Congo, which are often mobilized along ethnic lines, attribute their emergence to the imperative to defend their community from rival forces. This in turn created a security dilemma among Congo`s ethnic communities. Once armed groups emerge further clash invariably leads to humanitarian crisis generating joblessness and a range of other challenges, which disproportionately affect women and children. The outbreak of other humanitarian disasters like Ebola would complicate the problem by diverting governmental and non-governmental attention and resources to the disaster than addressing the conflict. The insecurity situation in turn complicate the effort to tackle the pandemic as health worker finds it difficult to deal with epidemic in an environment of insecurity.

That said, it has to be noted that the linkage between humanitarian and peace and security issues is just an element of a complex and multifaceted crisis in which all the pillars are interacting to give shape to the evolving security, statehood and welfare challenges of the Congolese state and the region at large. Indeed as one commentator indicated a dozen of interacting factors are behind the crisis which are ‘an absence of effective political and military control of vast territories, foreign interests through proxy actors, widespread impunity and absence of an independent judiciary, an under-resourced public social sector, including health and education systems, competition for natural resources, geopolitical instability, inter-ethnic tensions, lack of political will and absence of genuine and resourced domestic agendas for peace, development and humanitarian recovery.’⁷⁰

4. Interlinkages of the Four Pillars and Conflict Dynamics (2)

This explores the complex interlinkages of the four pillars and how this shape the risk of conflict, and the prospect of conflict prevention and resolution in Eastern Africa. This will use two case studies, namely South Sudan and DRC.

4.1. South Sudan

For more than seven years, South Sudan has been marred by persistent ethnic tensions that have triggered on-going armed insurgencies between Government and Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO [pro-Machar]) forces,⁷¹ and the parties continue to battle over control of

⁶⁹ Kivu security tracker, [Kivu Security Tracker | Crisis Mapping in Eastern Congo](#)

⁷⁰ SIDA, 2018,p.2 [MALL- Landanalys/strategi \(sida.se\)](#)

⁷¹ IGAD, 2019. *Lessons for IGAD Mediation Arising from the South Sudan Peace Talks: 2013-2015*. Djibouti: IGAD.

resources, mostly oil.⁷² Since South Sudan overwhelmingly voted to break away from Sudan in 2011, the country has not known peace. In December 2013, the country descended into civil war when fighting broke out between forces loyal to the government and opposition forces.⁷³ In January 2014, a ceasefire agreement was reached under international pressure but it soon collapsed in acrimony, with a swift resumption of hostilities. Fighting continued and was followed by the signing of another peace deal in May in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa. The deal paved way for a permanent ceasefire followed by the formation of a transitional government, the drafting of a new constitution and, eventually, fresh elections. However, several other ceasefire agreements followed but were repeatedly violated, notably the August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS). Renewed fighting broke out in Juba on July 7, 2016,⁷⁴ and the country has since remained highly unstable, prone to outbreaks of violence and is now in the grip of a massive humanitarian crisis. Following regional and international pressure – including targeted sanctions from the United States and a UN arms embargo - Kiir and Machar once again reached an agreement on 12 September 2018 to end the hostilities and form a unity government with Machar as vice president.⁷⁵ But the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), has neither resolved the power struggle between Kiir and Machar nor ended the country’s deep crisis.⁷⁶ Coupled with a history of multiple previous peace deals collapsing, reports of continued attacks and violations highlight concerns that the fragile peace may not hold.

South Sudan remains in a serious humanitarian crisis due to the cumulative effects of years of conflict which has destroyed people’s livelihoods.⁷⁷ Since the war broke out, at least 27,000 people have been killed, according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED),⁷⁸ these deaths have resulted from 6492 conflict events so far, including battles, explosions/remote violence, protest activities, riots, strategic developments and violence against civilians. In 2020 alone, ACLED recorded 773 conflict events and 2227 fatalities, despite the COVID-19 pandemic and the signing of the revitalized peace agreement.

Table 1: Conflict Events and Fatalities in South Sudan, Dec 2013 - Dec 2020

Conflict Event Type	Count of Event Type	Sum of Fatalities
Battles	3057	16903
Explosions/Remote violence	201	236
Protests	219	5
Riots	117	51
Strategic developments	454	0
Violence against civilians	2444	9661
Grand Total	6492	26856

72 UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, 2020. *“There is nothing left for us”: starvation as a method of warfare in South Sudan*. Available at:

https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoHRSouthSudan/A_HRC_43_56.docx

73 UN News, 2020. *Starvation used as weapon of war in South Sudan conflict, UN rights body finds*. Available at: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/10/1074742>

74 IGAD, 2019. *Lessons for IGAD Mediation Arising from the South Sudan Peace Talks: 2013-2015*. Djibouti: IGAD.

75 CFR, 2020. *Civil War in South Sudan*. Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan>

76 ICG, 2019. *Salvaging South Sudan’s fragile peace deal*. Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/270-salvaging-south-sudans-fragile-peace-deal>

77 World Bank, 2020. *South Sudan: Overview*. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southsudan/overview>

78 ACLED, 2020. *Data Export Tool*. Available at: <https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool/>

Another estimate by the Health in Humanitarian Crisis Centre at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine put the number of deaths at 383,000, explaining that between December 2013 and April 2018, about half of the fatalities resulted from ethnic clashes across the country, and the other half from disease, hunger and other causes.⁷⁹

The violence has caused more than 2 million to flee to neighbouring countries and more than a million displacements within the country. Some 1.62 million civilians are internally displaced persons (IDPs), 125,000 of whom have fled to Protection of Civilian sites (POCs). Another 2.2 million are refugees in neighboring countries.⁸⁰ The resulting insecurity has prevented farmers from planting or harvesting crops, causing food shortages nationwide. In February 2017, famine was declared in the country, with nearly 5 million people at risk from food insecurity. The country again faced critical food shortages in early 2018, with aid agencies warning that more than 7 million people were at the risk of severe food insecurity.⁸¹ While famine is no longer declared as of November 2017, an estimated 6 million people in the country are facing an acute food shortage, including some 1.3 million children and 352,000 women who are malnourished. 7.5 million South Sudanese women, men, and children - 67% of the population (currently estimated by UNFPA at 11.2 million)⁸² - need humanitarian assistance. A recent UN report found that food insecurity in Western Bahr el Ghazal, Jonglei, and Central Equatoria States is linked directly to the conflict and therefore almost entirely human-induced. It added that both Government and opposition forces have deliberately used the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare in these States, sometimes as an instrument to punish non-aligning communities, like Jonglei.⁸³ Due to severe food shortages, malnutrition regularly compromises the natural immunity of South Sudanese women, men, and children, and increases their susceptibilities to infection and severe episodes of communicable disease, including measles, malaria, diarrheal diseases, and tuberculosis, leading to preventable deaths.⁸⁴ Food insecurity compounded the physical insecurity in the country, leaving civilians with no alternative but to flee.

The fighting has also taken a toll on the human rights situation in South Sudan. According to a 2019 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, all parties to the conflict, particularly government forces, committed serious human rights violations and abuses, including indiscriminate attacks against civilians including aid workers, unlawful killings, beatings, vandalizing, looting and destruction of schools, health facilities and civilian property. The UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan has detailed government forces systematically attacked, pillaged, destroyed, and rendered useless objects indispensable to the survival of populations perceived to be non-aligned and supportive of the SPLA-IO (pro-Machar) forces – such as the Fertit and Luo communities, while rewarding government forces by allowing them to retain provisions stolen and looted from these communities.⁸⁵ People with disabilities, older people, women and children continued to be particularly vulnerable during attacks due to difficulties fleeing. Lack of accountability continues to fuel sexual violence against women and

79 The New York Times, 2018. *383,000: Estimated Death Toll in South Sudan's War*. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/world/africa/south-sudan-civil-war-deaths.html>

80 OCHA, 2020. *South Sudan: Humanitarian Snapshot (November 2020)*. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-snapshot-november-2020>; also see: UNHCR, 2020. *Refugees and asylum-seekers from South Sudan – total*. Available at: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/southsudan>

81 CFR, 2020. *Civil War in South Sudan*. Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan>

82 UNFPA, 2020. *State of World Population 2020*, p. 146. Available at: https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/UNFPA_PUB_2020_EN_State_of_World_Population.pdf

83 UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, 2020.

84 United Nations World Food Programme, WFP, 2020. *Hunger threatens over half of the population in South Sudan*. Available at: <https://www.wfp.org/news/hunger-threatens-over-half-population-south-sudan>

85 UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, 2020.

girls, as well as men and boys during armed attacks on their homes, while they were fleeing attacks or when they went to buy or search for basic necessities such as food and firewood around UN sites. The government continues to restrict media and civil society and arbitrarily detain perceived government opponents and critics, including human rights activists and academics. All sides recruited and used children despite repeated promises to stop. Some of the abuses constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity.⁸⁶

As a result of the continuing crisis, social norms and values have been eroded, and South Sudanese have had scant experience of good governance, the rule of law, and gender equity.⁸⁷ Political competition for the country's resources and corruption between political elites have been fueled by the ongoing lack of accountability and failure to address the underlying causes of the conflict, thus deepening impunity in the country.⁸⁸ The 2020 Human Development Index (HDI), which measures basic dimensions of human development, unsurprisingly ranks South Sudan in the low human development group as the fifth worst nation state in which to reside, at 185 out of 189 countries, with an HDI value of 0.433. This is below the average of 0.547 for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. With mean years of schooling among the adult population at 4.8 (the mean years of schooling for females is 3.9 and 5.2 for males) and expected years of schooling for children of school-entry age being 5.3, destruction of schools and the departure of teachers from many affected areas severely impact access to education. The Gender Inequality Index (GII) value for South Sudan is not available due to a lack of relevant data, but gender-based inequalities are widespread in the country. Women's share of employment in non-agriculture is 30.2%; only 26.6% of parliamentary seats are held by women, and only 4.7% of women aged 15 and above have an account at a financial institution. 71.0% of women participate in the labour force compared to 73.8 percent for their male counterparts.⁸⁹

Prolonged fighting has left the country with an extremely poor and underdeveloped infrastructure and limited human capital critical for promoting sustainable economic growth and development have been diverted elsewhere. The war has depleted the labour force, weakened institutions, and diverted financial capital from economic development, while roads, irrigation systems and other key components of rural infrastructure have been destroyed, damaged or neglected.⁹⁰ Structural challenges to economic transformation and sustainable development in South Sudan include the lack of economic diversification and high public debt.⁹¹ The economy is especially vulnerable to shocks such as flooding in parts of the country, locust infestation, the COVID-19 pandemic, and fluctuation in global oil prices. These shocks, coupled with economic mismanagement, have eroded the productive capacity of the country, undermined people's access to basic resources and exacerbated existing conflict-related vulnerabilities and humanitarian needs.⁹²

86 Human Rights Watch, 2019. *South Sudan: Events of 2018*. Available at:

<https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/south-sudan>

87 Tchie, A. E., 2020. *South Sudan: root causes of ongoing conflict remain untouched*. Available at:

<https://theconversation.com/south-sudan-root-causes-of-ongoing-conflict-remain-untouched-133542>

88 United Nations Human Rights Council, OHCHR, 2020. *Starvation being used as a method of warfare in South Sudan – UN panel*. Available at:

<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=26350&LangID=E>

89 UNDP, 2020. *Human Development Report 2020: The next frontier Human development and the Anthropocene*, p. 18. Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr_2020_overview_english.pdf

90 IFAD, 2013

91 AfDB, 2020.

92 World Bank, 2020. *South Sudan: Overview*. Available at:

<https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southsudan/overview>

Young people constitute almost 74% of the population,⁹³ yet remain the most under-employed. The country has yet to transform its natural endowments into improved livelihoods and infrastructure. South Sudan is one of the most oil-dependent countries in the world, with oil accounting for more than 95% of exports,⁹⁴ 90% of government revenue, and more than one-third of its gross domestic product (GDP).⁹⁵ Outside the oil sector, livelihoods are concentrated in low productive, unpaid agriculture and pastoralists work. But overdependence on proceeds from the sale of oil restrains investment in other sectors of the economy, many of which would produce more jobs for the country's youth. Development of the agricultural sector would counter this trend towards overdependence, but at present the sector remains subsistence-oriented, with low technology inputs and little marketable surplus.

Consequently, poverty levels remain extremely high on the back of severe food insecurity and limited access to basic services across the country. More than half the population lives below the international poverty line of \$1.90 a day, according to the most recent estimates; most of the poor are in rural areas, where 84 per cent of the population lives.⁹⁶ The vast majority of the population lives in traditional, thatched-roof houses with scant access to safe water and sanitation, education or other necessities.⁹⁷ Despite widespread poverty, the gross national income (GNI) per capita is 1,455 (2011 PPP US\$)⁹⁸ and is higher than any other East African nation. But income inequality is high: the GNI for males is 1,633 (2011 PPP \$) and 1,277 (2011 PPP \$) for females.⁹⁹ The World Bank estimated economic growth in the FY 2019/2020 at -4.3%, down from 3.2% in FY 2018/2019 which was the first positive GDP growth in five years.¹⁰⁰ The cost of living has continued to escalate markedly with the effects particularly acute in urban areas. Inflation averaged 87% during the first nine months of FY2019/20 higher than during FY2018/19. The South Sudanese pound (SSP) continues to depreciate with the gap between the official exchange rate and the parallel market rate estimated at 103% in June 2020.¹⁰¹ This has led to declining trade and skyrocketing cost of food and other commodities and services.

There is under-investment in the health and education sectors that would have the largest knock-on effect on poverty reduction and building resilience, with expenditures skewed toward defence and security at the expense of service delivery. The African Development Bank projects that education is expected to receive only 6% of the budget, health 1%, and social and humanitarian affairs only 2%.¹⁰² This de-emphasis of social spending is likely to erode social indicators and amplify the challenges of achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Destruction of health-care facilities, attacks on health workers, mean access to health care remains increasingly sparse, and preventable diseases like measles and diarrhea spread unchecked, causing increased mortality and morbidity. Destruction of schools and the departure of teachers from many affected areas, combined with poverty, child

93 UNFPA, 2020. *State of World Population 2020*, p. 146. Available at: https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/UNFPA_PUB_2020_EN_State_of_World_Population.pdf

94 AfDB, 2020. *South Sudan Economic Outlook*. Available at: <https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/east-africa/south-sudan/south-sudan-economic-outlook>

95 World Bank, 2020.

96 World Bank, 2020.

97 IFAD, 2013. Enabling poor rural people to overcome poverty in South Sudan. Available at: https://www.ifad.org/documents/38714170/39972426/south_sudan.pdf/d247bob7-fc4f-4e2c-a636-8ac91e66bfb

98 UNDP, 2019. *Human Development Report: Inequalities in Human Development in the 21st Century (Briefing note for countries on the 2019 Human Development Report - South Sudan)*. Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/SSD.pdf

99 UNDP, 2019. *South Sudan*. Available at: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/SSD>

100 World Bank, 2020.

101 World Bank, 2020.

102 AfDB, 2020.

marriage, cultural and religious views, severely impact access to education, with more than 2 million children (or over 70%) out of school – most of them girls.¹⁰³

4.2. Democratic Republic of Congo

According to the UNFPA State of the World Population 2020, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has a population of 89.6 million, making it the largest population in Africa. More importantly, it is right in the middle of a youth bulge: persons aged 0-14 years make up 45.8%; those aged 10-24 years account for 32.1%, and people aged 15-64 years account for 51.2% of the population.¹⁰⁴ With a fertility rate of 5.7 per woman and an annual population change rate of 3.2 %, it is projected that the overall population trend of the DRC will continue to move upwards by nearly 3 per cent annually.¹⁰⁵

Despite showing some promising signs, the DRC's macroeconomic outlook is worrying. Real GDP growth dropped to 4.3% in 2019 from 5.8% in 2018 due to a slowdown in extractives, the economy's main driver despite a fall in the price of copper and cobalt.¹⁰⁶ Growth has been driven by domestic demand, particularly private investment and public consumption. Forecasts suggest a slowdown in GDP growth in 2020 (3.9%) and 2021 (3.4%) due to reduced mining production. Despite considerable rationalization in public expenditure, the fiscal deficit for 2019 was 0.4% of GDP due to the implementation of the presidential emergency plan (the fiscal surplus was 0.4% in 2018). The current account deficit will likely worsen in 2020 (to 4.6% of GDP) and 2021 (4.3% of GDP), and the fiscal balance is likely to remain in the red (0.2% of GDP in 2020 and 0.3% in 2021), partly from financing the free education policy.¹⁰⁷

Owing to better coordination in monetary and budget policies, including considerable rationalization in public expenditure, the inflation rate which reached 29.3% in 2018, fell to 4.5% in 2019. This was partly because of capital inflows and other financial flows in 2019, including foreign direct investments (FDI), that have also helped protect official reserves while limiting the depreciation of the Congolese franc.¹⁰⁸ Average inflation in 2020 and 2021 is expected to stay around 5%.¹⁰⁹ DRC faces a moderate risk of debt distress thanks to its low debt (13.7% of GDP for external debt and 6.5% for domestic debt in 2018). As such, new external concessional loans can be secured. More than that, normalization of the political situation and a new determination to reform and fight corruption could instil a climate of confidence thereby promoting new private investment in sectors that drive the economy.

103 UNICEF, 2020. *South Sudan*. Available at: <https://www.unicef.org/southsudan/what-we-do/education#:~:text=More%20than%20two%20million%20children,able%20to%20attend%20regular%20classes>.

104 UNFPA, 2020. *State of World Population 2020*, p. 143. Available at: https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/UNFPA_PUB_2020_EN_State_of_World_Population.pdf

105 IFAD, 2020. Democratic Republic of the Congo. Available at: https://www.ifad.org/en/web/operations/country/id/dr_congo

106 African Development Bank, AfDB, 2020. *Democratic Republic of Congo Economic Outlook*. Available at: <https://www.afdb.org/en/countries-central-africa-democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-economic-outlook>

107 Ibid.

108 World Bank, 2020. *Democratic Republic of Congo: Overview*. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview>

109 AfDB, 2020.

Agriculture in the DRC has great potential for growth, but it is weakly exploited and does not meet the country's food needs.¹¹⁰ Besides great mineral resources, DRC has an extraordinary wealth of arable land, forest, biodiversity and water. Just 10 million of the country's 80 million hectares of arable land are cultivated. There is vast potential for growth, including of farming which generates just 40 per cent of GDP, but employs 70 per cent of the workforce.¹¹¹ However, agriculture suffers from low productivity while energy shortages have hindered industrialization efforts. The economy remains dependent on mining products, which makes it vulnerable to global price fluctuations. The dollarization of the economy reduces the efficiency of monetary policy. Structural weaknesses in internal revenue systems make it difficult to fund priority programs. Infrastructure shortages in most sectors continue to dampen economic development significantly.¹¹² Although the DRC initiated reforms aimed at strengthening governance in the management of natural resources and improving the business climate, the country is ranked 183 out of 190 countries in the *Doing Business 2020* report on business regulations¹¹³, and must address a host of challenges if it hopes to attract investors in key sectors.

The country's social situation remains precarious. While assessing long-term progress in three basic dimensions of human development,¹¹⁴ the UNDP's Human Development Report 2020, put the DRC's human development index (HDI) value for 2019 at 0.480, below the average of 0.513 for countries in the low human development group and below the average of 0.547 for Sub-Saharan Africa.¹¹⁵ With a life expectancy at birth standing at 60.7, mean years of schooling among the adult population at 6.8, expected years of schooling for children of school-entry age being 9.7 (8.6 for females and 10.8 for males), and gross national income (GNI) per capita (constant 2017 PPP\$) at 1,063, the DRC was ranked 175 out of 189 countries and territories. The country has a Gender Inequality Index (GII) value of 0.617, ranked at 150 out of 162 countries in the 2018 index. This ranking reflects gender-based inequalities in reproductive health, empowerment, and economic activity. Only 12% of parliamentary seats are held by women, and 36.7 percent of adult women have reached at least a secondary level of education compared to 65.8 percent of their male counterparts. For every 100,000 live births, 693.0 women die from pregnancy related causes; and the adolescent birth rate is 124.2 births per 1,000 women of ages 15-19. Female participation in the labour market is 60.8 percent compared to 66.5 for men.¹¹⁶

The DRC is a country of paradoxes: it is a land rich in natural resources – with vast amounts of resources, including minerals, oil, water, forestry, and agricultural land. The DRC is a world leading producer of copper and cobalt, and it also produces large amounts of coltan, diamonds, silver, and petroleum.¹¹⁷ But its people are among the poorest in the world. Although the rate of poverty in the DRC fell slightly over the past two decades, poverty remains a concern with 77% of the population living on less than \$1.90 a day.¹¹⁸ This represents 5% increase from 2018, when 72% of the population

110 African Development Bank, AfDB, 2012. *Congo, Dem. Rep.* Available at: <https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Congo%20Democratic%20Republic%20Full%20PDF%20Country%20Note.pdf>

111 IFAD, 2020.

112 African Development Bank, AfDB, 2020. *Democratic Republic of Congo Economic Outlook*. Available at: <https://www.afdb.org/en/countries-central-africa-democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-economic-outlook>

113 World Bank, 2020. *Doing Business 2020: Congo, Dem. Rep.* Available at: <https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/c/congo-dem-rep/ZAR.pdf>

114 A long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living.

115 UNDP, 2020. *Human Development Report 2020: The next frontier Human development and the Anthropocene*, p. 18. Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr_2020_overview_english.pdf

116 UNDP, 2020. *Human Development Reports: Congo, Democratic Republic of the*. Available at: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/COD>

117 UNECA, 2015. *Conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Causes, impacts and implications for the Great Lakes region*. Addis Ababa: United Nations

118 African Development Bank, AfDB, 2020.

was living in extreme poverty on less than \$1.90 a day.¹¹⁹ Poverty is more extreme for rural populations, especially in the North West and Kasai regions, than for urban dwellers. According to the African Development Bank, 72% of rural households and 59% of urban households are poor. Currently, 43% of households have access to drinking water (69% in urban areas, 23% in rural areas) and only 20% have access to sanitation.¹²⁰ Underemployment remains high as majority of employable active youth have limited access to jobs and socio-professional insertion programs, or lack decent working conditions. Young girls tend to be more disadvantaged than young men in access to work and experience worse working conditions than their male counterpart, and employment in the informal economy or informal employment is the norm. Faced with unemployment, poverty, and conflict in parts of the country, millions of young people in the DRC are forced to migrate in search of employment. While underemployment of youth plays a role in dampening economic development across the country, it is also a driver in criminal activities and conflict.¹²¹

The DRC is making headway in containing the Ebola epidemic which has been raging for almost two years in the provinces of Ituri, North-Kivu, and South-Kivu, where 3,453 cases and over 2,200 deaths have been reported. While the epidemic undermines economic development in these provinces, the provinces simultaneously face the highest concentration of violence and insecurity, with increased communal conflict and attacks targeting aid workers undermining the public health response.¹²² The country has also been battling the COVID-19 pandemic since March 10, 2020 and is currently implementing urgent measures to contain its spread. The pandemic is expected to trigger an economic recession (-2.2%) in 2020, stemming from weaker exports caused by the global economic downturn. However, the gradual recovery of global economic activity and the start of production at the Kamoakakula mine should pave the way for a rebound in economic growth to 4.5% in 2022.¹²³

At the same time, the country is fraught with armed clashes between the security forces and splintered ethnic militias, political instability, and human rights violations and a deepening humanitarian crisis, despite consistent efforts at the national, regional, and international levels to negotiate the end of wars and consolidate peace. According to UNECA, various peace deals that have been signed, including the six-country ceasefire signed in July 1999 in Lusaka; the July 2002 peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda for the pull out of Rwandan troops and disarmament of Rwandan Hutu militias in Eastern DRC; and the January 2008 accord between the DRC government and rebel groups. The ceasefires enabled the return of peace and preparation for an orderly transition to post-conflict, including the holding of elections in 2006 and 2011.¹²⁴ But insecurity remains an issue, especially in the Eastern region.

According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED),¹²⁵ the conflict events in the DRC range from battles, explosions/remote violence, protest activities, riots, strategic developments, and violence against civilians. Over the last five (5) years, there have been a total of 9543 conflict events, and more than 17,000 fatalities resulting from these, as indicated on the table below. In 2020 alone, ACLED recorded 3072 conflict events (32.2% of all conflict events in the country between

119 World Bank, 2020. *Democratic Republic of Congo: Overview*. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview>

120 World Bank, 2020.

121 IOM, 2019. *Promoting Youth Employment in Kinshasa*. Available at: <https://www.iom.int/news/promoting-youth-employment-kinshasa>

122 ACLED, 2019. *ACLED Fact Sheet: Conflict in the DRC*. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/acled-fact-sheet-conflict-drc>

123 World Bank, 2020. *Democratic Republic of Congo: Overview*. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview>

124 UNECA, 2015. *Conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Causes, impacts and implications for the Great Lakes region*. Addis Ababa: United Nations.

125 ACLED, 2020. *Data Export Tool*. Available at: <https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool/>

January 2016 and December 2020) and 5370 fatalities (31% of all fatalities in the country between January 2016 and December 2020).

Table 2: Conflict Events and Fatalities in the DRC, Jan 2016 - Dec 2020

Conflict Event Type	Count of Event Type	Sum of Fatalities
Battles	3224	9053
Explosions/Remote violence	39	137
Protests	1387	30
Riots	832	552
Strategic developments	884	0
Violence against civilians	3177	7578
Grand Total	9543	17350

These fatalities are sustained by an upsurge in ongoing violence across the country, particularly in the Kasai, Kivu, Tanganyika and Ituri regions. More than one hundred armed groups including the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Nduma Defense of Congo-Renove faction (NDC-Renove) continue to operate in the east despite the presence of more than 16,000 UN peacekeepers. These groups continue to terrorize communities and control weakly governed areas. The country's massive resource wealth - estimated to include \$24 trillion of untapped mineral resources - also fuels the violence.¹²⁶ The mineral trade provides financial means for groups to operate and buy arms. Concerned about the conflict and human rights violations in the country, and to prevent funding of armed militias, the United States (US) passed legislation in 2010 to reduce the purchase of 'conflict minerals' from the DRC.¹²⁷ This resulted in many miners losing their jobs, as multinational companies stopped buying minerals from the country, thus driving many Congolese to join armed groups as an alternative source of livelihood.¹²⁸

Meanwhile, tensions remain close to breaking point within the ruling coalition. The declaration of President Félix Tshisekedi as winner of the DRC's December 2018 presidential elections and his inauguration in January 2019 had marked the first peaceful transfer of power in the country's history. However, two years into his term, Tshisekedi faces the twin challenges of working within the fragile political coalition he formed with former President Joseph Kabila's Common Front for Congo (FCC) and reforming the vital mining sector in the country. Tensions triggered by Tshisekedi's alleged attempt to drum up support for his plan to break away from FCC have led to a rise in political violence in the country at even higher rates than last year at the conclusion of Joseph Kabila's nearly 20-year rule.¹²⁹ According to ACLED, between January and July 2019 alone, there were nearly 790 organized political violence events across more than 420 locations in the DRC, with 1,900 total conflict-related fatalities reported in connection with these events, including over 760 fatalities

126 UNECA, 2015. *Conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Causes, impacts and implications for the Great Lakes region*, p. 21. Addis Ababa: United Nations

127 Congressional Research Service, CRS, 2012. *Conflict Minerals in Central Africa: U.S. and International Responses*. Available at: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42618.pdf>

128 The Washington Post, 2014. *How a well-intentioned U.S. law left Congolese miners jobless*. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/how-a-well-intentioned-us-law-left-congolese-miners-jobless/2014/11/30/14b5924e-69d3-11e4-9fb4-a622dae742a2_story.html?utm_term=.00dc977b5acc

129 Council on Foreign Relations, CFR, 2020. *Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo*. Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo>

from violence targeting civilians. Mining sector tensions are also intensifying. Competition between industrial and artisanal miners has been a source of tension in the DR Congo's mineral-rich provinces of Haut-Katanga and Lualaba, leading to interventions by state security forces, according to Crisis Group's report, *Mineral Concessions: Avoiding Conflict in DR Congo's Mining Heartland*. In addition to deaths and injuries, the expulsions caused more than 10,000 artisanal miners to lose their only means of generating income, leaving the sector potentially explosive and bearing on the country's stability and development trajectory.¹³⁰

Continued armed conflicts and widespread impunity in the DRC have resulted in massive human rights violations, including attacks against civilians on a shocking scale, widespread rape and sexual violence.¹³¹ Some of the incidents may amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity, according to a July 2020 report by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. The OHCHR recorded a monthly average of 704 violations in 2019, a sharp increase from 2018's monthly average of 548. The report also documents widespread violations of civil and political rights throughout the country, and finds human rights defenders and journalists to be subject to threats, arbitrary detentions, harassment, and other violations and abuses. It documents rising sexual violence against women and girls.¹³² According to Amnesty International, dozens of local and foreign armed groups as well as the Congolese security forces, are largely responsible for the considerable increase in these violations and abuses of human rights.¹³³

The armed conflict and violence have affected thousands of families and created a deteriorating humanitarian situation. People have been killed, wounded, or traumatized.¹³⁴ Many villages have been razed to the ground; homes and relevant infrastructure have also been destroyed including a healthcare facility supported by Malteser International, which was demolished and looted.¹³⁵ The destruction of an already fragile healthcare system poses severe challenges in the fight against the deadliest and longest measles outbreak in the country's history, as well as its longest Ebola outbreak, and have left people without access to healthcare. The destruction of school infrastructures owing to the violence has left thousands of children without access to quality education. Due to looting, damage, or attacks in Djugu and Mahagi territories, over 60,000 out of school children have been recorded, of which 150 schools are nonfunctional. In the affected areas, over 51,000 children aged 5-17 years old are currently out of school because of population displacements and attacks on schools. As of January 2020, 3985 schools have been destroyed, of which 258 were destroyed as a result of ongoing ethnic violence and 140 schools due to natural disasters, in Tanganyika province.¹³⁶

130 International Crisis Group, ICG, 2020. *Mineral Concessions: Avoiding Conflict in DR Congo's Mining Heartland*. Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/290-mineral-concessions-avoiding-conflict-dr-congos-mining-heartland>

131 CFR, 2020.

132 United Nations Joint Human Rights Office OHCHR-MONUSCO, 2020. *Report on violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by the Allied Democratic Forces armed group and by members of the defense and security forces in Beni territory, North Kivu province and Irumu and Mambasa territories, Ituri province, between 1 January 2019 and 31 January 2020*. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/CD/ADF_EN.pdf

133 Amnesty International, 2020. *Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2019*. Available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/report-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/>

134 ICRC, 2020. *Armed Conflict and Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo*. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/where-we-work/africa/democratic-republic-congo/congo-civil-war>

135 OCHA, 2020. *Escalating violence worsens humanitarian situation in DR Congo*. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/escalating-violence-worsens-humanitarian-situation-dr-congo>

136 UNICEF, 2020. *Democratic Republic of the Congo Humanitarian Situation Report No. 01*. Available at: <https://www.unicef.org/media/79161/file/DRC-SitRep-January-2020.pdf>

As worsening violence destroys lives and livelihoods across the country, millions of civilians have been forced to flee the fighting: the UN estimates there are currently 4.5 million internally displaced persons in the DRC, more than 1 million Congolese returnees,¹³⁷ and more than 934,381 refugees seeking refuge in neighboring countries like Angola, the Republic of Congo and Zambia.¹³⁸ In the Kasai region, joint Government-World Food Programme statistics indicated that as many as 85 per cent of displaced communities and those who had returned to their homes in recent months were suffering from malnutrition.¹³⁹ Unsurprisingly, the DRC is home to the second largest food insecure population in the world. It is estimated that 15.6 million are severely food insecure, of which some 4.7 million suffer from acute malnutrition. As a result of displacement, fields that were used for crop cultivation are totally deserted. Far from their villages and traditional means of subsistence, thousands of families are facing an increasingly critical food shortage. Poor roads - that become impassable during the rainy season - and persisting insecurity in some areas have meant that thousands of people have not received any aid. In South Kivu Province for instance, some 400,000 people are estimated to have been cut off from aid since late 2019 in the areas of Bijombo, Fizi and Itombwe.¹⁴⁰ Women, children and the elderly have paid a heavy price in terms of health, access to food and protection. Despite the desperate needs of the communities and the growing risk of starvation, humanitarian organizations are struggling to get through, mainly because of the lack of security, passable roads and funding. Following numerous attacks against humanitarian organisations, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has recently withdrawn its staff from Kimbi and Baraka in Fizi territory, South Kivu province.¹⁴¹ This humanitarian situation is a consequence of a complex web of factors, including insecurity, abandoning fields and lack of economic opportunities.¹⁴²

5. Interlinkages of the Four Pillars and Trans-Regional Dimensions

This explores the trans-regional dimensions of the four pillars and interlinkages in Eastern Africa, primarily using case studies (Ethiopia in relation to Sudan in the context of recent/ongoing armed conflict). In exploring transboundary dimensions, issues such displacement/refugees, non-state armed groups, natural disasters, food security, agriculture, and natural resources are analysed in relation to the risk and impacts of armed conflict, and conflict prevention and management prospect.

5.1. Ethiopia

Following four years of street protests that broke out in 2014 over discrimination against the Oromo – the country’s largest ethnic group – and spread to other groups, especially the Amhara, its second

137 UNHCR, 2020. *Democratic Republic of Congo*. Available at:

<https://reporting.unhcr.org/node/4874?y=2020#year>

138 UNHCR, 2020. *Refugees and Asylum Seekers from DRC*. Available at:

<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/drc>

139 OCHA, 2020. DR Congo: A complex web of humanitarian needs, 1 May 2020. Available at:

<https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-complex-web-humanitarian-needs-1-may-2020#:~:text=It%20is%20estimated%20that%20some,to%20miss%20out%20on%20school>

140 Ibid.

141 MSF, 2020. *DRC: Violent attacks against staff force MSF to end projects in Fizi territory, South Kivu*. Available at: <https://www.msf.org/msf-forced-pull-out-eastern-drc-territory-following-violent-attacks>

142 OCHA, 2020.

largest, the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) elected Abiy Ahmed Ali prime minister in April 2018. Abiy inherited a dangerously weak economy with foreign debt in excess of \$24 billion; regional leaders were demanding more power while old guards were resistant to reform. Discontent with tough socio-economic conditions, as well as with the ruling party's 27 years in power and its domination by a small, mostly Tigrayan, elite, was already widespread. Ethnic tension and insecurity were intensifying and proliferating across the country, with communal violence tearing at the multi-ethnic fabric of Ethiopian society. Abiy pledged reform and peace; went on to make peace with old-foe Eritrea, while strengthening ties with other neighbours and influential Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, with whom relations were previously fraught. At home, he extended a conciliatory hand to opponents, sent long-serving politicians and security officials into overdue retirement; promised moves to free and fair elections and expanded political space.¹⁴³ These important reforms won plaudits from Ethiopians who have been protesting for change since 2014 and from donors eager to see democratic reform. But enormous obstacles remain.

With more than 115 million people,¹⁴⁴ Ethiopia is the second most populous nation in Africa after Nigeria, and the fastest growing economy in the region. However, it is also one of the poorest, with up to 83.5% of the population in multidimensional poverty, and the share of the population living below the national poverty line is 30.8%.¹⁴⁵ Ethiopia's main development challenges are sustaining its positive economic growth and accelerating poverty reduction, which both require significant progress in job creation, as well as improved governance.¹⁴⁶ The latest Human Development Report 2020 ranks Ethiopia among the low human development countries at 173 out of 189 countries, with an HDI score of 0.485. In terms of gender inequality, it has a GII value of 0.517 and is ranked at position 125. The life expectancy at birth stands at 66.6; expected years of schooling is 8.8 (8.3 for females and 9.3 for males), and gross national income (GNI) per capita (constant 2017 PPP\$) is 2,207. The country has a Gender Inequality Index (GII) value of 0.517, and is ranked at 125. This ranking reflects gender-based inequalities in reproductive health, empowerment, and economic activity. Only 37.3% of parliamentary seats are held by women, and just 29.1% of females above 15 have an account at a financial institution or with mobile money-service provider. Those aged between 15-64 make up 56.5% of the population with 79.5% of this participating in the labour force; female participation in the labour force is 73.4 percent compared to 85.8 for men.¹⁴⁷

Like the rest of the world, Ethiopia has been experiencing the unprecedented social and economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. While the economy experienced strong, broad-based growth averaging 9.8% annually from 2008/09 to 2018/19, with industry (mainly construction) and services accounting for most of the growth, the overall adverse economic impact on Ethiopia has been substantial. The price of basic foods is skyrocketing, growth is slowing down, unemployment is on the rise, and poverty is increasing. Ethiopia has been experiencing the worst locust invasion in decades which threatens the food security and livelihoods of millions of Ethiopians, while undermining

143 International Crisis Group, ICG, 2019. *Managing Ethiopia's Unsettled Transition*. Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/269-managing-ethiopias-unsettled-transition>

144 UNFPA, 2020. *State of World Population 2020*, p. 143. Available at: https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/UNFPA_PUB_2020_EN_State_of_World_Population.pdf

145 UNDP, 2020. *Ethiopia: Human Development Indicators*. Available at: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/ETH>

146 World Bank, 2020. *Ethiopia: Overview*. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview>

147 UNDP, 2020. *Human Development Report 2020: The next frontier Human development and the Anthropocene*, p. 18. Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr_2020_overview_english.pdf

development gains. Ethiopia's private sector remains underdeveloped, and this continues to limit the country's trade competitiveness, constrains job creation, and resilience to shocks.¹⁴⁸

The unfolding conflict between the Federal government and the regional state of Tigray, could negatively impact growth through lower foreign direct investment, tourism, and exports. After the ruling party of Tigray, the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF), which once led the ruling party coalition that preceded the Abiy government launched a pre-emptive attack on the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) Northern Command, the federal government responded with an operation to regain control of the regional state and apprehend the TPLF leadership. Disagreement over the postponement of the anticipated August 2020 elections owing to the COVID-19 pandemic set the stage for the crisis. While the decision had broad support from political forces in Ethiopia, the decision by the House of Federation to extend the mandate of the prime minister and the parliament did not enjoy political consensus. The Tigray region decided to proceed with organizing the state-level elections in defiance of the federal government and without the engagement of the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE), another step was taken towards November's violence.

The underlying cause of the tensions extend beyond postponed elections and COVID-19. They reflect broader, unresolved debates about Ethiopia's transition and federal arrangements and are anchored in unaddressed reports, documentation and legacy of corruption, human rights abuses and state repression under the TPLF's leadership in the previous regime, along with allegations that the TPLF has been fomenting some of the disorder, violence and chaos during the transition period. The crisis is an example of the type of violence that has become all too common in the country. On November 1, ethnically targeted killings left at least 54 people dead in a schoolyard in the Wollega zone of Oromia state. Throughout western Ethiopia, communal violence has only increased since 2018. An attack on a bus in Benishangul-Gumuz in western Ethiopia left at least 34 people dead on November 14 and marked the latest in an unrelenting pace of violence. In southern Ethiopia, tensions remain high, as the consequences of the model of ethnic federalism continue to unfold.¹⁴⁹ Although federal forces captured Tigray's regional capital and announced an end to military operations, Tigray leaders vowed to continue fighting.¹⁵⁰

The confrontation which began on November 4th is quickly "spiraling out of control with appalling impact on civilians".¹⁵¹ There have been reports of gross human rights violations and abuses including indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian objects, looting, abductions and sexual violence against women and girls. Some Tigrayan youth have also been forcefully recruited to fight against their own communities. Ethnic profiling is on the rise: there have been reports of dismissals from jobs, including in the civil service, harassment of Tigrayan journalists and hate speech against Tigrayans. In the weeks leading up to the crisis, the federal government reorganized security institutions, including the ENDF, and several prominent political figures and journalists were jailed. Earlier in July, Amnesty International reported that at least 15,000 people had been arbitrarily arrested and detained as part of the government's crackdown on armed attacks, violence and following protests in Oromia. Solely

148 World Bank, 2020. *Ethiopia: Overview*. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview>

149 USIP, 2020. *The Unfolding Conflict in Ethiopia: Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations*. Available at: <https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/12/unfolding-conflict-ethiopia>

150 International Crisis Group, 2020. *CrisisWatch: Global Overview*. Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch>

151 Al Jazeera, 2020. *Ethiopia conflict 'spiralling out of control': UN*. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/9/ethiopia-conflict-spiralling-out-of-control-un>

focusing on what is going on today in Tigray risks obscuring broader concerns about democratic backsliding, repression and violence elsewhere in the country.¹⁵²

There is little information about the death toll or internal displacement, but initial reports suggest heavy casualties and human suffering. Thousands of people, including four aid workers, are thought to have been killed.¹⁵³ The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that dire shortages of the most basic supplies, including food, water, fuel and cash were affecting the whole region, leading to a looming humanitarian catastrophe. With access to water, sanitation & health services seriously disrupted, there is heightened risk of water-borne and vector-borne diseases, as well as COVID-19. The conflict continues to force people from their homes, with an estimated 100,000 internally displaced as well as 850,000 people who were already in need of humanitarian assistance before the conflict began.¹⁵⁴ Even before the Tigray crisis, the International Organization on Migration (IOM) reported in September that more than 1.8 million people had been internally displaced in 2020 primarily because of conflict, but also because of drought.¹⁵⁵ The violent conflict has also prompted close to 50,000 refugees to flee into eastern Sudan,¹⁵⁶ 45% of which are women and children.¹⁵⁷ Amnesty International confirmed that thousands of Eritrean refugees hosted in the Tigray region have fled those camps, and arrived at the city of Gondar in the Amhara region, as well as in Addis Ababa.¹⁵⁸ Hundreds of refugees remain close to the border and are worried about the destruction of their crops, which were due for harvest. This is likely to impact food security in the area in the coming months.¹⁵⁹

Access to the worst affected areas has been severely restricted due to military action, a communications blackout, and the suspension of civilian flights to airports in the region. Ethnic Tigrayans have been targeted through travel restrictions and through removal from civil service and military posts.¹⁶⁰ Because of the restrictions have made the coordination of humanitarian aid humanitarian actors have been unable to provide essential services to vulnerable and affected populations. They have also limited the ability of independent monitors and journalists to document and report on the hostilities and the human rights situation in the region, including into refugee camps.¹⁶¹ In November, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported that local hospitals and health facilities are running dangerously low on medical supplies to care for the

152 Ibid.

153 France 24, 2020. *Ethiopia's Tigray conflict: UN calls forced return of Eritrean refugees 'disturbing'*. Available at: <https://www.france24.com/en/tv-shows/eye-on-africa/20201211-ethiopia-tigray-conflict-un-calls-forced-of-refugees-to-tigray-disturbing>

154 OCHA, 2020. *Ethiopia – Tigray Region Humanitarian update: Situation Report, 7 Dec 2020*. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Situation%20Report%20-%20Ethiopia%20-%20Tigray%20Region%20Humanitarian%20Update%20-%207%20Dec%202020.pdf>

155 International Organisation for Migration, IOM, 2020. *IOM Report: Ethiopia Records More Than 1.8 Million Internally Displaced in 2020*. Available at: <https://www.iom.int/news/iom-report-ethiopia-records-more-18-million-internally-displaced-2020>

156 International Crisis Group, 2020. *CrisisWatch: Global Overview*. Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch>

157 OCHA, 2020. *Ethiopia – Tigray Region Humanitarian update: Situation Report, 7 Dec 2020*

158 Amnesty International, 2020. *Ethiopia: International humanitarian aid must be allowed into Tigray refugee camps amid food shortage warning*. Available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/12/ethiopia-international-humanitarian-aid-must-be-allowed-into-tigray-refugee-camps-amid-food-shortage-warning/>

159 Ibid.

160 USIP, 2020. *The Unfolding Conflict in Ethiopia: Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations*.

161 Human Rights Watch, 2020. *Q & A: Conflict in Ethiopia and International Law*. Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/25/qa-conflict-ethiopia-and-international-law>

wounded as well as other mounting medical needs and conditions.¹⁶² Doctors and nurses have been forced to make horrible life and death decisions, like suspending intensive care services.¹⁶³

The conflict has cross-border impacts. Humanitarian actors in Ethiopia and across the border in Djibouti, Eritrea and Sudan remain concerned over the humanitarian situation in Tigray, that is currently affecting operations in neighboring countries. The conflict continues to forcibly displace people into Sudan, where humanitarians are reporting complex logistical and operational challenges in the response. Although UNHCR reported a decline in the average daily arrivals from about 2,000 people per day to about 700 people between 1 and 2 December, the number of people crossing the border started to increase again over the last days. UNHCR and partners in Sudan have warned about the urgent need for additional refugee settlement sites, as the Um Rakuba camp in Gedaref State, now with about 10,500 people, has surpassed its maximum capacity of 10,000 people.¹⁶⁴

Ethiopia is pivotal to the stability of the Horn of Africa. Its unravelling would have a major impact beyond its borders. Addis Ababa has already recalled some troops from neighbouring Somalia, where it supports the African Union mission to fight the Al-Shabaab insurgency; threatening to create a security vacuum as that country heads into a tense electoral cycle. Eritrea, which shares a frontier with Tigray and whose President Isaias Afwerki is close to Abiy, could also well be drawn into confrontation with the TPLF. The party dominated Ethiopia's ruling coalition when the country was at war with Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Neighbouring Sudan is also involved. With Tigray squeezed between Eritrea to the north and federal forces elsewhere, it has its eyes on east Sudan to import vital supplies. However, Sudan has closed its border with Tigray, potentially blockading the region, which already had 600,000 people in need of aid.¹⁶⁵

To restore peace in Ethiopia, external partners need to persuade both sides to cease fire urgently and unconditionally. Ethiopia's partners, from regional leaders to the AU to the EU and UN Security Council members, all have a part to play in pointing out to Abiy's government that Ethiopia's problems ultimately need to be resolved politically, through talks, and not through force. The existence of IGAD brings a new diplomatic dimension to conflict management in the Horn of Africa.¹⁶⁶ Having led peace processes in Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia with relative success, IGAD should take steps towards mediating the ongoing conflict in Ethiopia.

6. Impact of COVID-19 on the Pillars and Inter-Linkages

162 ICRC, 2020. *Ethiopia: Hospitals in Mekelle struggling to care for wounded as medical supplies run out; Red Cross ambulances evacuate the injured*. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/ethiopia-hospitals-mekelle-struggling-care-wounded-medical-supplies-run-out-red-cross>

163 Al Jazeera, 2020. *Ethiopia conflict 'spiralling out of control': UN*. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/9/ethiopia-conflict-spiralling-out-of-control-un>

164 OCHA, 2020. Ethiopia – Tigray Region Humanitarian update: Situation Report, 7 Dec 2020

165 ICG, 2020. Ethiopia: Not too Late to Stop Tigray Conflict from Unravelling Country. Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/ethiopia-not-too-late-stop-tigray-conflict-unravelling-country>

166 Healy, Sally (2011). Seeking peace and security in the Horn of Africa: the contribution of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development. *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944), 87 (1): 105-120

This section explores how COVID-19 pandemics impacts the four pillars and their interlinkages in Eastern Africa. According to Africa CDC data, index cases of COVID-19 were recorded across Eastern Africa subregion in March 2020, and by 15 December 2020, the 14 states covered in this study had recorded a total of 292,069 cases. The region ranks third (behind Southern and North Africa, respectively) in the number of COVID-19 cases recorded thus far. COVID-19 cases are most rampant in Ethiopia with 117,000 cases (40%), followed by Kenya with 92,000 (32%), and Uganda with 27,800 cases (10%). The combined total for the three states account for 82% of COVID-19 cases in Eastern Africa.¹⁶⁷

Since March 2020, there have been different phases of COVID-19 pandemic in Eastern Africa with the first wave and flattening of the curve around July, and what appears to be a second wave picking up in November. The responses by national, regional, and international actors have varied with the patterns of infection; lockdowns and stringent restrictions relaxed in July-October for instance. The general mitigation measures introduced across the region are social distancing, masks, hand washing and use of hand sanitisers; awareness creation; closure of educational and religious centres; restrictions on social gatherings; suspension of international flights and travel to countries with high COVID-19 cases; and restrictions on internal movement from areas with reported cases; quarantine for travellers; and restrictions on border crossing except for essential services and cargo.¹⁶⁸ Regional bodies, including COMESA, EAC, and IGAD, working with national and Africa CDC, have issued guidelines and made effort to coordinate responses across the region.¹⁶⁹ The EAC secretariat for instance, launched initiatives to facilitate regional trade such as TradeMark East Africa's \$20 million Safe Trade Emergency Facility (STEF) with mobile laboratories, test kits, and personal protective equipment for truckers in the East African Community.¹⁷⁰

States in the regional have also benefitted from global-level response frameworks and activities, including the UN COVID-19 Global Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) – an “comprehensive inter-agency response plan that aggregates and updates relevant existing humanitarian appeals from UN and non-UN entities, government and non-governmental bodies to ensure preparedness and adequate response to immediate health and non-health needs/responses to the pandemic.”¹⁷¹ There is also the Global (UN) Socio-Economic Response Framework that focuses on protecting the needs and rights of vulnerable population, especially women and girls, labourers and informal sector workers, IDPs and refugees, asylum seekers, returnees, migrants, people with disabilities, marginalized groups and people in hard-to-reach areas.¹⁷² Intervention focuses on access to health services, social protection, supporting jobs and livelihoods, social cohesion and community-led resilience approaches,

¹⁶⁷ For COVID-19 cases in Eastern Africa, see <https://africacdc.org/covid-19/>

¹⁶⁸ UN Habitat (2020), 'Impact of COVID-19 on Livelihoods, Food Security and Nutrition in East Africa: Urban Focus', 03 August 2020, p.4, https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000118161/download/?_ga=2.171251236.52939194.1608039387-1892780603.1608039387


¹⁶⁹ See COMESA (2020), 'COVID-19: Measures in Member States as at 04 December 2020', COMESA Secretariat, <https://www.comesa.int/measures-in-member-states-in-response-to-covid-19-6/>

¹⁷⁰ Andrew Mold and Anthony Mveiyange, 'Crisis? What crisis? COVID-19 and the unexpected recovery of regional trade in East Africa,' Brookings, September 28, 2020, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/09/28/crisis-what-crisis-covid-19-and-the-unexpected-recovery-of-regional-trade-in-east-africa/>

¹⁷¹ UNOCHA (2020), 'Global humanitarian Response Plan April-December 2020: COVID-19', p.9. <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-humanitarian-response-plan-covid-19-april-december-2020-ghrp-july-update-enar>

¹⁷² UNOCHA (2020), 'Global humanitarian Response Plan April-December 2020: COVID-19', p.16. <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-humanitarian-response-plan-covid-19-april-december-2020-ghrp-july-update-enar>

and strengthening multilateral and regional responses.¹⁷³ The global level response efforts also seeks to adjust and expand significant portions of the UN’s existing US\$17.8 billion portfolio of sustainable development programmes towards COVID-19 related needs.¹⁷⁴



Source: <https://twitter.com/igadsecretariat/status/1338552175723769861/photo/1>

Since March 2020, the scale of the impact of COVID-19 in Eastern Africa and Africa broadly, continues to evolve. The impact and the effect of national, regional and global-level responses have varied across countries, depending on the nature/strength of the economy, pre-existing socio-economic vulnerabilities, including social tensions and armed conflicts, humanitarian issues (displacement and food security issues,) and environmental/climate challenges, etc. The broad areas ways in which the COVID-19 pandemic has affected the four pillars and their interlinkages in Eastern Africa include the following:

- a. Economic Growth: According to UNECA’s initial estimates (in March 220), COVID-19 was expected trigger sharp decline in Africa’s economic growth rate from 3.2% to 1.8% with variations across countries and regions. The hit to economic growth is expected to come from

¹⁷³ UN (2020), ‘A UN framework for the immediate socio-economic response to COVID-19’, April 2020, p.1, https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/un_framework_report_on_covid-19.pdf

¹⁷⁴ UN (2020), ‘A UN framework for the immediate socio-economic response to COVID-19’, April 2020, p.2, https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/un_framework_report_on_covid-19.pdf

disruptions to global demand and value chain creation, demand side shocks (oil, tourism and remittances), slow down in investment leading to job losses, inflationary pressures, unanticipated rise in health spending (worth \$10.6 billion and revenue losses (likely to trigger debt distress).¹⁷⁵ Economies in Eastern Africa that rely on tourism (Island nations and Kenya), and commodity exports took direct hit as commodity prices dropped by up to 67%, metal declined by 20% on December-end values, and the price of cotton fell 26 per cent.¹⁷⁶ Also, agricultural production and export also got affected; for instance, the horticulture industry in Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda was badly hit, leading to job losses. In March 2020, the Ethiopian horticulture industry reportedly lost \$11 million (this would have multiplied since then) potentially resulting in the layoff of 150,000 people, and heavy losses by banks that lend to the sector.¹⁷⁷ An updated economic analysis by Deloitte in May 2020 shows even greater impact of COVID-19 on economic growth in Africa (Africa’s projected GDP growth of 3.2% for 2020 is now expected to fall to -0.8%).¹⁷⁸ The GDP growth for Eastern Africa for 2020 has been revised downwards from 5.1% to 0.2-1.2% due to disruptions to trade, tourism, agriculture, aviation and manufacturing, sharp drop in remittances and 15% drop in FDI, economic growth in major economies in Eastern Africa are now much lower than thought; Kenya’s growth is expected to be around 1% from 5.7%, and similar declines in Uganda, Tanzania and Ethiopia.¹⁷⁹ Although some countries (Tanzania, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Uganda) could still end up posting positive growth, and regional trade and some exports had rebounded by July.¹⁸⁰

- b. Food Security: Before COVID-19, Eastern Africa subregion had substantial number of food insecure population due to adverse weather, crop pests (locust), intercommunal violence and armed conflicts, large refugee populations and internal displacements.¹⁸¹ In 2019, “around 20% of global estimates of acutely food insecure persons in need of urgent humanitarian food – some 27 million people – were in six IGAD member states (Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan and Uganda), were classified in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) and the six countries continue to experience weather extremes, conflict/insecurity and economic shocks, and desert.¹⁸² This vulnerabilities have been accentuated by COVID-19 in 2020, especially as a slight increase in acute food insecurity levels, mainly due to weather-related shocks in Kenya and a confluence of weather and conflict shocks in South Sudan.¹⁸³

¹⁷⁵ UNECA (2020), ‘Economic Impact of COVID-19 on Africa’, Briefing Presentation, 13 March 2020, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

¹⁷⁶ UNECA (2020), ‘COVID-19 in Africa: Protecting Lives and Economies,’ Addis Ababa, UNECA, p. 14. <https://repository.uneca.org/handle/10855/43756>

¹⁷⁷ UNECA (2020), ‘COVID-19 in Africa: Protecting Lives and Economies,’ Addis Ababa, UNECA, April 2020, p. 19. <https://repository.uneca.org/handle/10855/43756>

¹⁷⁸ Deloitte (2020), ‘Economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on East African economies Summary of government intervention measures and Deloitte insights, May 2020, <https://www2.deloitte.com/ke/en/pages/finance/articles/impact-of-covid19-on-ea-economies.html>

¹⁷⁹ Deloitte (2020), ‘Economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on East African economies Summary of government intervention measures and Deloitte insights, May 2020, <https://www2.deloitte.com/ke/en/pages/finance/articles/impact-of-covid19-on-ea-economies.html>

¹⁸⁰ Andrew Mold and Anthony Mveyange, ‘Crisis? What crisis? COVID-19 and the unexpected recovery of regional trade in East Africa,’ Brookings, September 28, 2020, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/09/28/crisis-what-crisis-covid-19-and-the-unexpected-recovery-of-regional-trade-in-east-africa/>

¹⁸¹ GNAFC/FSIN (2020), Global Report on Food Crises: 2020’, p.3. <https://www.wfp.org/publications/2020-global-report-food-crises>

¹⁸² GNAFC/FSIN (2020), Global Report on Food Crises: 2020’, p.30. <https://www.wfp.org/publications/2020-global-report-food-crises>

¹⁸³ GNAFC/FSIN (2020), Global Report on Food Crises: 2020’, p.30. <https://www.wfp.org/publications/2020-global-report-food-crises>

- c. Humanitarian Challenges: The subregion continues to host over 4 million refugees and asylum seekers, and over 7.6 million IDPs, especially from conflict-affected South Sudan, DRC, and Somalia. Most of the refugees (over 1.4 million) are in Uganda.¹⁸⁴ The large refugee and IDP and asylum seekers remain dependent on humanitarian food and assistance, but funding and new operational routines as a result of COVID-19 have constrained access and operations. This has led to cuts in food rations and non-food assistance in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and South Sudan.¹⁸⁵ In Ethiopia, an estimated 15 million people could experience food consumption gaps as a result of COVID-19, and the risk of transmission and increased humanitarian assistance is especially high among the 1.7 million IDPs across the country.¹⁸⁶ In Somalia, travel bans restricted the movement of humanitarian staff and operations, trapped the cross-border movement of freshly displaced persons (from violence) in Gedo and Dollo Ado regions in Somalia and Ethiopia, respectively.¹⁸⁷
- d. Livelihoods: COVID-19 mitigation strategies have disrupted livelihoods, especially for women and youth working in agri-food supply chains and the informal sector across Eastern Africa.¹⁸⁸ Sharp declines in demand and prices, especially exports, have left farmers poorer and layoffs in agriculture export industries. Increased urbanization has attracted more youth to urban areas, mostly working in the informal sector or the service sector, and COVID-19 has put their livelihoods under considerable strain (because they survive on daily hand-to-mouth wages).¹⁸⁹ The stringent testing regimes at border crossings have led to long queues and delays in moving agri-food supplies, affected livelihoods of support services (transporters) and impacted overall flow of trade. It also affected the supply (shortage) of seeds, fertilizers, crop treatment materials, etc., all likely to reduce outputs of staple foods and worsening the food security situation across the region.¹⁹⁰ Women and young people in rural working in farms for flowers, coffee and fish face the most financial uncertainty and losses – it is estimated that 92% of working women are employed in the informal sector, heightening the risks they face of sexual exploitation and abuse due to economic vulnerability.¹⁹¹ For women, having to care to children who are home due to school closures imposes additional burden.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁴ GNAFC/FSIN (2020), Global Report on Food Crises: 2020', pp.31-32.

<https://www.wfp.org/publications/2020-global-report-food-crises>

¹⁸⁵ GNAFC/FSIN (2020), Global Report on Food Crises: 2020', pp.31-32.

<https://www.wfp.org/publications/2020-global-report-food-crises>

¹⁸⁶ UN-OCHA (2020), 'Southern and Eastern Africa COVID-19 Digest: Situation Report', 28 August 2020, p.12

<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Situation%20Report%20-%20Southern%20and%20Eastern%20Africa%20COVID-19%20Digest%20-%2028%20Aug%202020.pdf>

¹⁸⁷ UN-OCHA (2020), 'Southern and Eastern Africa COVID-19 Digest: Situation Report', 28 August 2020, p.28,

<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Situation%20Report%20-%20Southern%20and%20Eastern%20Africa%20COVID-19%20Digest%20-%2028%20Aug%202020.pdf>

¹⁸⁸ UN Habitat (2020), 'Impact of COVID-19 on Livelihoods, Food Security and Nutrition in East Africa: Urban Focus', 03 August 2020, p.6, https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000118161/download/?_ga=2.171251236.52939194.1608039387-1892780603.1608039387

¹⁸⁹ UN Habitat (2020), 'Impact of COVID-19 on Livelihoods, Food Security and Nutrition in East Africa: Urban Focus', 03 August 2020, p.7, https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000118161/download/?_ga=2.171251236.52939194.1608039387-1892780603.1608039387

¹⁹⁰ IIED (2020), 'How COVID-19 is impacting and changing East Africa's agri-food systems', 07 August 2020, <https://www.iied.org/how-covid-19-impacting-changing-east-africas-agri-food-systems>

¹⁹¹ UN-OCHA (2020), 'Southern and Eastern Africa COVID-19 Digest: Situation Report', 28 August 2020, p.2, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Situation%20Report%20-%20Southern%20and%20Eastern%20Africa%20COVID-19%20Digest%20-%2028%20Aug%202020.pdf>

¹⁹² IIED (2020), 'How COVID-19 is impacting and changing East Africa's agri-food systems', 07 August 2020, <https://www.iied.org/how-covid-19-impacting-changing-east-africas-agri-food-systems>

- e. Governance and Human Rights: COVID-19 continues to have implications for democratic governance, including human rights, rule of law, free and fair elections, and accountability mechanisms. In some cases, there have been heightened police brutality in enforcing COVID-19 measures, increase in violence against women and girls (including rape), and increased militarization or securitization of governance (misuse of emergency powers). In Kenya, Human Rights Watch reports several allegedly cases of police violence in the enforcement of curfews, including alleged brutalisation of citizens, extortion, looting of food, etc. Kenya's Independent Policing Oversight Authority record of at least 35 cases of police brutality related to enforcement of the COVID-19 curfew, 12 of which resulted in death would appear to confirm this.¹⁹³ An estimated 247,334 women have been sexually assaulted, including over 5000 rape cases recorded in health facilities between March and June 2020.¹⁹⁴ Election was either postponed (Ethiopia) or held with question marks on participation and associated risks (e.g. Burundi and Tanzania). The post parliamentary and regional state polls in Ethiopia has served as a trigger for armed conflict between the Central government and Tigray regional government in Ethiopia. In Uganda, in the run up to presidential polls in January 2021, ban on public gathering (due to COVID-19) has been imposed Ahead of the presidential election in early 2021, the Electoral Commission announced a ban and campaigns restricted to online platforms.¹⁹⁵

7. Normative and Policy Frameworks in Eastern Africa

Across Eastern Africa, there are global and regional, and subregional normative frameworks and policy initiatives that incorporate the four pillars and potentials for harnessing their interlinkages. Over the past decade, the UN, and the Africa (through the AU) have advanced a series of cooperation in specific areas that are designed to promote coherence and synergies relevant to the interlinkages of the four pillars. This is embodied in the series of UN-AU Cooperation Frameworks that have continental and regional relevance for countries in Eastern Africa. For instance, the AU-UN Peace and Security Framework highlights key areas of collaboration and synergies for preventing and managing conflicts in Africa through increased common understanding of the causes (including the four pillars and their interlinkages) of conflict in Africa; joint conflict prevention efforts through coordinated early warning and preventive diplomacy; cooperation in mediation and conflict management, synergies in planning

193 UN-OCHA (2020), 'Southern and Eastern Africa COVID-19 Digest: Situation Report', 28 August 2020, p.14, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Situation%20Report%20-%20Southern%20and%20Eastern%20Africa%20COVID-19%20Digest%20-%2028%20Aug%202020.pdf>

¹⁹⁴ UN-OCHA (2020), 'Southern and Eastern Africa COVID-19 Digest: Situation Report', 28 August 2020, p.14, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Situation%20Report%20-%20Southern%20and%20Eastern%20Africa%20COVID-19%20Digest%20-%2028%20Aug%202020.pdf>

¹⁹⁵ UN-OCHA (2020), 'Southern and Eastern Africa COVID-19 Digest: Situation Report', 28 August 2020, p.37, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Situation%20Report%20-%20Southern%20and%20Eastern%20Africa%20COVID-19%20Digest%20-%2028%20Aug%202020.pdf>

and managing peace operations and peacebuilding, and coordinated efforts in sustainable and predictable funding and resource mobilisation for peace and security in Africa.¹⁹⁶

The AU-UN Agenda 2030/2063 Development Framework includes a commitment to joint activities and programmes for the effective implementation, tracking and monitoring of and reporting on the Agenda 2030 and Agenda 2063 to promote Africa's inclusive, broad-based, and sustainable development. This framework recognises the importance of the links between development, human rights, and humanitarian work to the reduction of risk and vulnerability, especially among young people and women. The framework aims at strengthening "the linkages between political governance and respect for human rights, peace and security, resilience and development by building on joint programmes and activities under the Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security."¹⁹⁷

The AU and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), through a memorandum of understanding and a joint workplan on humanitarian issues, work to support the capacity of African states and regional institutions to respond to humanitarian emergencies and strengthening their regional disaster response capacities. As part of this initiative, OCHA collaborates with AU and RECs (EAC, IGAD, COMESA and IOC) to advance initiatives on the protection of civilians, resilience planning and disaster preparedness.¹⁹⁸ Similarly, in September 2019, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) signed an MoU to foster cooperation through exchange of views and good practices on human rights norms and standards, and jurisprudence of regional bodies; supporting joint actions; and joint engagement on human right issues.¹⁹⁹

The EAC

The EAC was set up in 1999 as a regional integration body to develop and coordinate policies and programmes across member states in the fields of socio-economic, political, cultural, technology, defence and security, and legal and judicial affairs for mutual benefits. The stated aims and activities of the EAC acknowledge the four pillars, as well as their interlinkages in relation to conflict prevention and management. For instance, the stated aims of the EAC incorporate socio-economic, political (governance and human rights), natural resources and environmental sustainability, humanitarian issues especially in the context of armed conflict, and peace and security issues. According to Article 5(3) of EAC Treaty, the core aims of the body include promoting economic growth and development, strengthening cooperation in selected sectors to raise standards of living and the quality of life of citizens, promote sustainable exploitation of natural resources and protect the environment, and promote people-centred development. The EAC also seeks to mainstream gender and enhance the role of women across its activities and sectors, promote partnership with other stakeholders to

¹⁹⁶ See https://unoau.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/joint_un-au_framework_for_an_enhanced_partnership_in_peace_and_security.pdf

¹⁹⁷ See UNECA (2018), 'United Nations. Economic Commission for Africa (2018-01). AU-UN framework for the implementation of agenda 2063 and the 2030 agenda for sustainable development.' Addis Ababa: UNECA, p.22, <https://repository.uneca.org/bitstream/handle/10855/24248/b1188311x.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y>

¹⁹⁸ See UNOCHA, "OCHA's support to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Planning and Coordinating Agency", <https://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/unsystemfolder/2014/ocha2014.pdf>

¹⁹⁹ See 'MoU between African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)', p. 3. https://www.achpr.org/public/Document/file/English/MOU%20ACHPR-OHCHR_EN.pdf

achieve sustainable development, and promote peace and security within and between member states.²⁰⁰

In 2012, the EAC passed the Community Conflict Management Act (CMA) as the framework for conflict prevention and resolution. The Act empowers a Panel of Eminent Persons as the arrowhead for conflict prevention efforts in the EAC region using mediation, peaceful settlement, cooperation in conflict management and coordination of post-conflict processes.²⁰¹ By February 2013, the EAC fully institutionalised and expanded its conflict prevention and management through the EAC Peace and Security Protocol with the core purpose of promoting peace, security and stability within the ECA and good neighbourliness among partner states. It seeks to protect citizens and the community against instability and breakdown of law and order, coordinate matters on peace and security, and develop capacity to prevent, anticipate, and respond to conflicts and other crisis situations in the region.²⁰²

The protocol set up an early warning system to track structural vulnerabilities and proximate causes of conflicts and facilitate preparedness and early response to conflict situations. It also highlighted areas of cooperation among member states to include conflict management and resolution, prevention of genocide, combating terrorism and piracy, peace support operations and disaster risk reduction and crisis response, the management of refugees, control of illicit small arms and light weapons, and addressing cattle rustling and transnational/cross-border organised crime.²⁰³

IGAD

The agreement setting up the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development also acknowledges the importance of the four pillars and basis for exploring their interlinkages. For instance, IGAD underscores peace, security, and stability as sine qua non for economic development and social progress. More broadly, IGAD's declared objectives and priority sectors (agriculture, natural resources and the environment; economic and social development; peace and security and humanitarian affairs; and corporate development services) incorporates the four pillars.²⁰⁴ Article 7 of the founding agreement articulates the objectives to be promoting joint strategies and harmonize economic policies on trade, agriculture, natural resources; facilitate trade and development; achieve food security and combat drought and other natural disasters; promote sustainable development and environment protection; and promote peace and security in the region.²⁰⁵

IGAD's evolution has strengthened programmatic policies and actions on the four pillars and their interlinkages; for instance, the 2016-2020 Regional strategy identifies agriculture, natural resources, and the environment as one of the main thrusts. Here, IGAD seeks to boost "agricultural production and sustainable management of natural resources and the environment to ensure resilient livelihoods

²⁰⁰ EAC (1999), 'Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community', https://www.eacj.org/?page_id=33

²⁰¹ This is according to articles 3 and 4 of the EAC CMA. See EAC (2012) "EAC Conflict Management Act 2012", p. 12, <https://www.eala.org/index.php/documents/view/eac-conflict-management-act2012>

²⁰² This is according to Article 3 of the Protocol. See EAC (2013), 'EAC: Protocol on Peace and Security', p. 8, <http://eacgermany.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/EAC-PROTOCOL-ON-PEACE-AND-SECURITY.pdf>

²⁰³ Article 2 of the Protocol defines the scope/areas of cooperation. See EAC (2013), 'Protocol on Peace and Security', p. 8.

²⁰⁴ See Article 18(A) of the IGAD Agreement. See IGAD (1995), "Agreement Establishing the IGAD", p. 15, <https://www3.nd.edu/~ggoertz/rei/rei475/rei475.01tt.pdf>

²⁰⁵ IGAD (1995), Agreement Establishing IGAD, p. 7.

and sustained economic growth in the region.”²⁰⁶ This has led to IGAD strategies on food security, fisheries, regional environment policy and environment impact assessment framework, and IGAD drought disaster resilience and sustainability initiative. The recurring challenges of climate-induced environmental changes and challenges, including severe drought (2010-11), locust invasion, flooding, etc. in the region has made environmental issues a core priority for IGAD. This underscores why the Regional Strategy also identifies building disaster resilience another thrust of IGAD’s strategy.

The 2016-2020 Strategy also reinforce the peace and security agenda of IGAD as contained in the founding agreement and the IGAD Regional Peace and Security Strategy. It emphasizes continued programmes on conflict early warning and early response, preventive diplomacy and mediation, combatting transnational threats, addressing humanitarian issues, enhance post-conflict reconstruction and development, and promoting good governance, democracy, human rights and the rule of law (as core conflict prevention issues). Other core areas of work include advancing gender equality and women empowerment, and active conflict management and resolution as demonstrated in conflicts (peace processes) in South Sudan, Somalia, and Sudan.²⁰⁷

COMESA

The COMESA Treaty (as revised in 2009) is an important framework with provisions for each of the four pillars, as well as potentials for their interlinkages. COMESA’s overarching aim is to improve the socio-economic wellbeing of its citizens through a people-centred approach to development. This places huge premium on democratic governance, social justice, economic opportunities, gender equality, youth and women empowerment.²⁰⁸ Under Article 3 of COMESA Treaty, the stated core aims include promoting sustainable growth and development of the Member States; promoting joint development in all fields of economic activity and the joint adoption of macro-economic policies and programmes to raise the standard of living of its peoples and to foster closer relations among its Member States; and co-operation in the creation of an enabling environment for foreign, cross border and domestic investment. Others include co-operation in the promotion of peace, security and stability among the Member States in order to enhance economic development in the region; strengthening the relations between the Common Market and the rest of the world and the adoption of common positions in international fora; and contribute towards the establishment, progress and the realisation of the objectives of the African Economic Community.²⁰⁹

The articulation of fundamental principles by COMESA also embodies implications for the four pillars and their interlinkages, including the recognition of a peaceful environment as a requisite for economic development and the attainment of the objectives of the Common Market. Specifically, Article 6 of the COMESA Treaty includes provisions for non-aggression and peaceful settlement of disputes among Member States; recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; accountability, economic justice and popular participation in development; the recognition and observance of the rule of law and the promotion and sustenance of a democratic system of governance in each Member

²⁰⁶ IGAD (2016), ‘IGAD Regional Strategy: The Framework, Vol.1’, p. 25, <https://igad.int/documents/8-igad-rs-framework-final-v11/file>

²⁰⁷ IGAD (2016), ‘IGAD Regional Strategy: The Framework, Vol 1’, p. 26.

²⁰⁸ COMESA (2016) ‘Medium-Term Strategic Plan 2016-2020’, p. 32. <https://www.comesa.int/comesas-new-plan-for-the-next-five-years/>

²⁰⁹ COMESA, (2009) Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa’, p. 18. https://www.comesa.int/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/comesa-treaty-revised-20092012_with-zaire_final.pdf

State; and the maintenance of regional peace and stability through the promotion and strengthening of good neighbourliness.²¹⁰

COMESA also embeds commitments to people-centred development, gender equality and women and youth empowerment as stated under Articles 110, 143, 154 and 155 of the COMESA Treaty, as part of its social development aspirations. COMESA member states are also signatories to major regional and international conventions on gender and women, and social development, including the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Beijing Platform for Action (1995); UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989); African Youth Charter (2006); Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development; Millennium Development Goals and the Sustainable Development Goals, and the African Union Agenda 2063.²¹¹

COMESA has also developed programmes and initiatives that reinforced its treaty provisions. For instance, the 2016-2020 Medium-Term Strategic Plan emphasizes economic development through trade facilitation, market integration and investment promotion.²¹² The Strategic Plan has fostering gender equality and social development as a strategic objective, and also makes good governance and readiness to identify and address global and regional threats a core priority. This includes the objective of mitigating disruptions to businesses arising from natural and man-made disasters, and peace and security challenges. The core targets of its peace and security agenda include developing mechanisms and tools to address conflict, insecurity and instability in the COMESA region; support Member States to consolidate democracy and good governance; and utilize the COMESA Committee of Elders to support the prevention, mitigation and resolution of conflict.²¹³

Consequently, COMESA launched a Programme on Governance, Peace and Security to promote peace, and stability and democratic governance through coordinated national and regional institutional mechanisms. The key focus include conflict prevention, management, and post conflict reconstruction; security efforts to address money laundering and financing of terrorism; and support for democracy and governance through election observation programmes.²¹⁴ All this underscores the imperative of peaceful environment through co-operation and consultations for preventing, managing and resolving inter-state or intra-state conflicts and insecurity.²¹⁵

The elements of the peace and security programme include yearly summit by COMESA Ministers of Foreign Affairs to address issues of peace and security; a Committee of Elders that consults with stakeholders in the region including the business community, civil society organizations and parliamentarians; and working the AU-APSA and other RECs to achieve synergy.²¹⁶

COMESA has launched two flagship programmes in this area; first is the “Trading for Peace programme” across the border areas in the Great Lakes region with the objective of using trade and

²¹⁰ COMESA, (2009) Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa’, p. 27.

https://www.comesa.int/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/comesa-treaty-revised-20092012_with-zaire_final.pdf

²¹¹ COMESA (2016) ‘Medium-Term Strategic Plan 2016-2020’, p. 11. <https://www.comesa.int/comesas-new-plan-for-the-next-five-years/>

²¹² COMESA (2016) ‘Medium-Term Strategic Plan 2016-2020’, p. 9. <https://www.comesa.int/comesas-new-plan-for-the-next-five-years/>

²¹³ COMESA (2016) ‘Medium-Term Strategic Plan 2016-2020’, p. 33. <https://www.comesa.int/comesas-new-plan-for-the-next-five-years/>

²¹⁴ <https://www.comesa.int/programme-activities-peace-and-security-programme/>

²¹⁵ COMESA (2016) ‘Medium-Term Strategic Plan 2016-2020’, p. 11. <https://www.comesa.int/comesas-new-plan-for-the-next-five-years/>

²¹⁶ <https://www.comesa.int/programme-activities-peace-and-security-programme/>

investment as a mechanism for peace and stability, and post-conflict recovery.²¹⁷ Second is an early warning mechanism (COMWARN), launched in 2005 as system for tracking structural factors (vulnerability) to conflict.²¹⁸ The COMWARN includes a four-element composite index, namely peace, health, wealth and trade openness, translated into 79 sub-indicators covering governance, education, social welfare, environment, economic opportunities, security, military and health issues.²¹⁹

8. Challenges and Opportunities for Harnessing the Inter-linkages

The four pillars and their interlinkages as an upgrade on the triple nexus (humanitarian-peace-development) remains an attractive proposition in theory and in policy declarations. Extant studies into specific case studies, and across the documentation of practice (practitioners), including the case studies examined herein, point to gaps and challenges in the field. The range of challenges in Easter Africa are highlighted as follows:

- Low-level awareness and advocacy among non-governmental stakeholders, including civil society groups, researchers, media, etc. This may not be unconnected with the lack of a research agenda across universities and think-tanks in the region. This will point to the lack of ownership by local/regional actors and stakeholders working across the four pillars.
- There is evidence of greater awareness and effort to explore/apply the interlinkages of the four pillars among UN agencies and INGOs, and increasingly this is percolating to AU policy processes, especially in conflict prevention and peace processes (conflict management) in places such as Somalia and South Sudan, however this is yet to fully integrated in any systematic way (it remains ad-hoc and opportunistic), and there is little evidence that RECs such as EAC, IGAD, COMESA are actively applying the interlinkage lens to their programming and interventions.
- Even among UN agencies and INGOs, coherence in practice/field-level needs to get better. The coherence in developing frameworks is not matched at the field level due some divergence in principles and practices, competing priorities, work template (lack of jointness), etc. For instance, in DRC, Ethiopia and Somalia, there is low alignment and sometimes tensions between stabilization/security component relative to humanitarian and human rights aspects. Moreover, the different pillars are under the preview of different actors that do not necessarily act out of a common vision. At the international level, for instance, peace and security issues are to be dealt with by the security council, an organ mainly concerned with international peace and security while human rights issues are under the preview of the UN human rights commission. Though human rights violation that eventually leads to crisis might

²¹⁷ <https://www.comesa.int/programme-activities-peace-and-security-programme/>

²¹⁸ Etyang, O., Chinembute, T and Abdulkadir, T. (2016), 'Conflict Prognosis: The COMESA Early Warning System in Perspective', *International Journal of Scientific Research and Innovative Technology*, Vol. 3 No. 11; November 2016, p. 6.

²¹⁹ Etyang, O., Chinembute, T and Abdulkadir, T. (2016), 'Conflict Prognosis: The COMESA Early Warning System in Perspective', *International Journal of Scientific Research and Innovative Technology*, Vol. 3 No. 11; November 2016, pp.9-10.

be highlighted early on by this commission, they will not be acted up on unless and until the security council deem the issues a matter of international peace and security. At the regional level, the problem will even be further complicated because lack of normative frameworks sincerely agreed by member states. The East African Community's engagement in ending the Burundian Crisis, for instance, remained lukewarm because a disjuncture between the technocratic and the political leadership in which the latter do not have interest meddling in member states politics.²²⁰ It is not the case that regional organization do not have mandate to deal with the various pillars; it rather that members frequently disregard what they have agreed to, a factor that cannot be simply be reduced to lack of capacity. The same can be said at national level in which one organ of government, mainly the executive or a sub-office thereof, frequently will have more power while the concerns of other organs are relegated to the back burner no matter how important they are for conflict prevention. There are capacity gaps at national and subregional levels to systematically translate and apply the interlinkages into concrete priorities, especially by civil society groups/NGOs, faith-based organisations. The silo-approach continues to be the norm with NGOs/CSOs continuing to work in distinct pillar area, as opposed to across the four pillars. Moreover, the inadequate and irregular funding for local CSOs, and the uneven power relations between local and international NGOs also limit their capacity to develop or acquire the capacity to work across the four pillars.

- There is inadequate funding for the scale of work, and capacities required to translate theoretical into practical interlinkages across the four pillars in Eastern Africa. The scale of humanitarian, development, human rights and peace and security challenges require substantial investment commitment over a period. The outbreak of COVID-19 appears to worsen the funding gaps for work across the four pillars, as well as constrain (and divert resources and capacities of local, national, and subregional actors. According to UN-OCHA, the COVID-19 Global Humanitarian Response Plan is just 23% funded, underlining the need for more resources to enable partners to scale-up responses.²²¹
- The negative loop does not need a conscious human agent to set off. For example, if by accident of history a conflict flared up in a certain place/country it will invariably generate international and national displacement and therefore humanitarian crisis. On the other hand, ending a conflict does not automatically end the humanitarian problem. Hence, the vicious circle (a bad outcome in one pillar leading to a deterioration in another) is stronger than the virtuous circle (progress in one pillar leading to improvement in another) for the very reason that human have no problem externalizing their cost while they are not likely to undertake an action with positive externality. Though what is said so far is a mere theoretical possibility, there is still a lack of knowledge on the extent and form this will take in concrete situation. We do not still know much that countries that are peaceful are countries that harness the synergy though those that descend into violence are those that failed to prevent the vicious circle of problems in the different pillars. Since the virtuous circle is not the exact replica of the vicious circle, we do not know if success in preventing conflict is manifestations of harnessing the synergy or some other factors. Ethiopia under EPRDF, for instance, foreclosed the possibility for civil war not necessarily harnessing the linkage but by massive repression of

²²⁰ Camilla Elowson and Adriana Lins de Albuquerque (2016). Challenges to Peace and Security in Eastern Africa: The role of IGAD, EAC and EASF

²²¹ UN-OCHA (2020), 'Southern and Eastern Africa COVID-19 Digest: Situation Report', 28 August 2020, p.2, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Situation%20Report%20-%20Southern%20and%20Eastern%20Africa%20COVID-19%20Digest%20-%2028%20Aug%202020.pdf>

human rights and the deployment of much effort and resource in the social and material technology of surveillance.

- National development visions, which has recently attracted attention, were supposed to be the organizing principle of governmental or even societal action and thus principal means for coordinating conduct under different pillars. In reality, some governments could act contrary to the vision when it dilutes their power. There might be several reasons for this. In some circumstances, the situation might be such that the aspiration of all the elites of a country cannot be satisfied generating elite competition that side-line the vision. When state power is a principal means of enrichment, not everyone can join the ruling class hence the very reason that generated the problem in each pillar become a problem against harnessing the synergy. In others, the elite may not buy into the vision at all. In Kenya, for example, the second APRM review, indicated that certain powerful elite do not buy into the national vision of inclusive society and hence the lack of commitment for synergizing the pillars.
- Political undercurrents, especially at the national level (and lack of clarity as to the role of national government) remain a factor in the (im)possibility of aligning and harnessing the interlinkages across the four pillars in Eastern Africa. Problems related to the pillars attract external attention only when they are sufficiently worse that opportunity to act early on will be missed; Even if external actors wish to do so, they will be resisted by national actors that often have stake in outcomes. As experience from IGAD's mediation from South Sudan indicate early action is of utmost importance in the prevention of conflict though such early intervention efforts are not often backed by coordinated attention of sufficient political weight.²²²
- Ultimately harnessing the synergy is also hampered (dependent on) by political economy dynamics at the subregional, national, and local levels that draws in a variety of powerful and interested actors within and outside of Eastern Africa. When powerful actors developed self-restraint for the sake of the synergy, we will not see the vicious cycle and that case we will not be able to see whether the synergy is harnessed for good end. When they are indifferent, active external involvement may shift the balance towards synergy; and when they are hostile, there is no hope of synergizing the pillars without forceful external involvement. Since external involvement itself presupposes a benign actor solely interested in synergized outcome and since this is mostly lacking, it is uncertain that external involvement would do the trick. That seems to be the reason why the pillar tends to go together, meaning that countries that are in crisis such as DRC, Somalia, South Sudan tend to have problem in all pillars even if external actors sought to transform these countries. This also point to the fact that any analysis of the pillars and their interlinkage cannot wish away analysis of actors and their interest. IGAD clearly indicated this when it indicated that the lesson it has learned from the South Sudan peace talk was this: 'If the parties are not ready to make peace, pushing them to sign an agreement prematurely is perilous. If international pressure and guarantees cannot be maintained during the implementation phase and beyond, there is a high risk that the agreement does not hold.'²²³
- The fact that synergizing the pillars does not mean just doing good in each pillar is also the other challenge. There has been time where humanitarian actors inadvertently contributed for the prolongation of crisis as do development interventions. The early controversy over the

²²² IGAD, nd. A report on: Lessons for IGAD mediation arising from South Sudan Peace Talk 2013 - 2015

²²³ Ibid, p.26

role of humanitarian actors in Congo in the 1990s in sustaining the genocidal incursion into Rwanda is a case in point. Even currently the assessments of existing regional organization seem to indicate that these organization operate based on the logic that any good outcome in one pillar will eventually positively affect others.

- Existing RECs (and member states) working on regional organization are characterized by overlapping membership which might undermine coherent and unified action. Each of the organization with membership of Eastern African states, namely Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the East Africa Community, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development claim to work on conflict prevention areas while they would have had developed niches where each of them could add to what the other would not have contributed. This would have also addressed the resource gap each of these organization are facing. Currently, all these organizations have shortage of critical personnel, fund to run some of their programme, and lack the capacity to successfully manage key programmes.²²⁴

Opportunities for Coordinating/Harnessing the Synergy

[TO BE ADDED]

9. Capacity Development Issues in Mainstreaming Interlinkages

[TO BE ADDED]

this will explore existing methodologies and tools for harnessing the interlinkages and mainstreaming into policies and strategies, and capacity building needs in relation to the adoption and application of tools. This will draw from extant policy documents/data and feedback from questionnaire surveys to reflect and present on the capacity development issues in mainstreaming the inter-linkages into policies and strategies.

10. Conclusions and Action-Oriented Recommendation

[TO BE ADDED]

²²⁴ Ejeviome Eloho Otobo, nd. Regional Economic Communities and Conflict Prevention in Africa: An Overview of Capacity Gaps and Priority Needs

Annexes:

1. Survey Questionnaire

2. Statistical Annex for Eastern Africa

Name	Pop	Area (km2)	GDP (US \$ bn)	GDP per capita (US\$)	Humanitarian (2019)		Development		Social Progress Index (2019)	Human Rights		World Press Index (2020)	Peace and Security		
					Conflict (IDPs)	Disasters (IDPs)	HDI (2018)	SDG-I (2020)		Freedom to make life choices (2019)	Dem Index (2019)		WPS 2019/2020	Global Peace Index (2019)	Fragile States Index (2019)
Kenya	48,756,000	580,367	108.074	1,877	162000	1400	0.579	54.54	53.51	0.431	5.18	33.72	0.700	2.300	93.5
Tanzania	51,605,000	947,300	63.000	798		1300	0.528	57.00	52.69	0.417	5.16	40.25	0.704	1.860	80.1
Uganda	45,319,000	241,038	33.000	851	32000	1100	0.528	55.71		0.356	5.02	40.95	0.678	2.196	95.3
Burundi	9,879,000	27,830	2.976	301	23000	12000	0.423	50.37	39.09	0.22	2.15	55.33	0.616	2.520	98.2
Rwanda	11,887,000	26,338	9.052	762		5500	0.536	57.65	52.96	0.555	3.16	50.34	0.743	2.014	87.5
South Sudan	13,137,000	644,329	5.239	399	1352000	246000	0.413	32.35	24.44	0.202		44.49	0.479	2.207	112.2
Djibouti	921,804	23,200	2.187	2,084			0.495	51.30	48.05		2.77	76.73	0.604	2.434	85.1
Ethiopia	109,224,414	1,104,300	103.607	1,066	390000	1414000	0.47	54.15	45.41	0.344	3.44	32.82	0.651	2.434	94.2
Eritrea	6,081,196	117,600	8.116	1,295			0.434	44.17	31.61		2.37	83.5		2.504	96.4
DR Congo	101,780,263	2,345,409	46.117	501	5512000	168000	0.459	44.83	36.77	0.269	1.13	49.09	0.512	3.218	110.2

Comoros	850,688	1,861	1.179	1,349			0.538	46.98	52.04	0.142	3.15	29.77	0.632		81.7
Madagascar	26,262,313	587041	12.734	471			0.521	47.94	43.58	0.148	5.64	27.68	0.622	1.867	80.9
Mauritius	1,265,475	2,040	14.812	11,693		100	0.796	66.79	74.88	0.498	8.22	28	0.752	1.606	38.9
Seychelles	97,096	459	1.564	16,332			0.801					28.66			55.2
Somalia	15,893,219	637,657	5.218	348	2648000	600	0.351	42.73		0.559		55.45	0.564	3.574	112.3

